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THE TAXATION OF INCOME AVAILABLE FOR
DISCRETIONARY USE
Deborah A. Geier*
While the signature tax policy tension of the last two decades (at
least) has been whether the federal tax base ought to reach "income" or
only "consumption," there is, I believe, a persuasive argument that this
debate misses the point. I think the key to understanding the theoretical
construct underlying our desires for the "ideal" tax base - as well as
the key to improving current law - is that we wish to protect from
taxation wealth accessions spent on "nondiscretionary" consumption or
saved for future nondiscretionary consumption. This distinction
between "discretionary" and "nondiscretionary" income, first explored
several decades ago by Canada's Royal Commission on Taxation in
connection with a progressive rate structure, has significant explanatory
force with respect to several key provisions in our current tax base and
offers a promising route to significant reform.
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The average two-income family earns far more today than did
the single-breadwinner family of a generation ago. And yet,
once they have paid the mortgage, the car payments, the taxes,
the health insurance, and the day-care bills, today's dual-
income families have less discretionary income - and less
money to put away for a rainy day - than the single-income
family of a generation ago.
Elizabeth Warren & Amelia Warren Tyagil
I conclude that the primary tax reform agenda is not centered
on enacting some pure form of taxation.
C. Eugene Steuerle
2
ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THETWo-INCOME TRAP:
WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 8 (2003) (emphasis
in original).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The signature tax policy tension of the last two decades (at least)
has been whether the federal tax base ought to reach "income" or
only "consumption." A close examination of the contours of the
current tax base in Part II, however, provides convincing evidence
that the true value underlying our conception of the "ideal" tax base is
that wealth accessions that are not fairly available for contribution to
the fisc should be protected from taxation, while wealth accessions
that are fairly available should be currently taxed. Wealth accessions
may be considered not fairly available for contribution to the fisc if
either spent on current nondiscretionary consumption or placed in
savings to fund future nondiscretionary consumption. Wealth
accessions may be considered fair game to the extent that they fund
current discretionary consumption or fund savings for future
discretionary consumption.
The importance of the distinction between "discretionary" and
"nondiscretionary" income to tax policy was explicitly recognized in a
1966 report written by Canada's Royal Commission on Taxation.3
Although that Commission raised the distinction in defending a
progressive rate structure, as Part III shows, the idea has persuasive
force in defining the tax base, as well. Part IV examines the 2000-2001
Consumer Expenditure Survey (published in 2003) in the course of
discussing the Nondiscretionary Deduction that I propose as a
replacement for the Standard Deduction, the Personal and Dependent
Exemption Deductions, the Child Tax Credit, the Qualified
Residence Interest Deduction, the Deduction for State and Local
Income and Property Taxes, and perhaps the Dependent Care Credit
and the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits. As further explored
below, the Nondiscretionary Income Deduction would be keyed to
median outlays rather than the actual outlays of each taxpayer,
although the amount of the deduction would be derived under a
"check-the-box" format that takes into account relevant taxpayer
"status" criteria (such as household size, whether the taxpayer owns
or rents a home, perhaps whether the taxpayer or dependent is a full-
time student in higher education, etc.). While simplification would be
a welcome side effect to this approach, it is based in principle - in a
rationalization of the implicit values underlying current law - and not
2 C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 235 (2004).
3 See 3 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION 1-24 (1966)
[hereinafter ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT].
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on a desire for simplicity for its own sake.
If "discretionary" income is more fairly taxed than
"nondiscretionary income," the reduced tax rate for net capital gain
and dividend income, as well as the blanket exclusion for home sale
gain, are indefensible. I discuss the latter in Part IV in connection
with shelter costs, and the former in Part V.
Moreover, as described in Part VI, the values espoused in this
article also imply that large gratuitous receipts (above an
administratively feasible exemption amount of, say, $25,000 per year),
whether received as an inter vivos receipt or at death of the transferor,
should be included in the recipient's tax base. All included in-kind
receipts could then take a fresh, fair market value basis, as under
current section 1014 (section 1015 would be retained only for in-kind
receipts excluded under the de minimis rule), and the wealth transfer
taxes (the estate, gift, and generation-skipping tax regimes) could be
permanently repealed. Finally, with a properly tailored tax base, the
Alternative Minimum Tax should be repealed.
II. EVIDENCE OF OUR CONCEPTION OF THE "IDEAL" TAX BASE
DRAWN FROM CURRENT LAW
A pure income tax generally taxes both amounts spent on current
consumption and amounts saved. A pure consumption tax (such as a
cash-flow consumption tax, a retail sales tax, or a value-added tax), in
contrast, taxes only amounts spent on consumption, deferring tax on
amounts saved until withdrawn from investment and spent on
consumption. Another conception is to say that an income tax
reaches both returns to labor and returns to capital, while a
consumption tax generally reaches only returns to labor.4 That is to
say, with identical investment returns and tax rates, a wage tax (a tax
on only labor income) can reach the same end result as a consumption
tax.5
These descriptions are not free of controversy. Consumption tax proponents
would argue that an income tax taxes capital returns twice and consumption outlays
only once, while a consumption tax taxes capital returns only once, putting them on
equal footing with consumption expenditures. The income tax proponent would reply
that this argument requires "collapsing" time in a way that ignores taxpaying capacity
as time progresses. These arguments are not the focus of this Article, but the reader
interested in a general introductory description of these differing conceptions can see
JOSEPH M. DODGE, J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR. & DEBORAH A. GEIER, FEDERAL
INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 72-76 (3d ed. 2004).
5 See id. at 72-73.
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At the individual level, the current Internal Revenue Code
(Code) (payroll taxes aside, for the moment) incorporates an income
tax base with numerous consumption tax components - provisions
that allow either immediate deduction of a nonconsumption capital
expenditure (as under a cash-flow consumption tax) or exclusion of
the returns to capital (as under a wage tax). A few of the most
noteworthy cash-flow consumption tax components include the
6deferral of contributions to qualified pension plans, regular
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs),7 and Health Savings
Accounts;8 the deferral of the inside buildup on life insurance; the
deferral of gain on most other assets under the "realization
requirement"; expensing of certain long-lived business assets;9 and the
accelerated rate of regular depreciation for many assets.' ° These are
consistent with a cash-flow consumption tax because they effectively
allow full or partial deduction of an investment prior to the time the
investment is lost or consumed. A few of the most noteworthy wage
tax features include the exclusion of most home sale gain, 1 state and
local bond interest, 2 Roth IRA returns, 3 and life insurance proceeds
paid by reason of the death of the insured. 4 A more subtle wage tax
feature is the reduced tax rate, at the individual level, of most capital
gain and dividend income. 5 (A pure wage tax would apply a zero
rate.)
The hybrid nature of the current Code is often said to be the chief
indicator that it is theoretically dysfunctional (as well as inexcusably
complex on an administrative level). The confluence of income and
consumption tax provisions seems to indicate that we simply cannot
make up our minds which base is "best," and thus we have enacted a
hodgepodge of provisions from both worlds, picking and choosing
here and there from both menus. But there is a persuasive argument
6 See I.R.C. 33 401-420.
7 See I.R.C. § 408.
8 See I.R.C. § 223. Actually, Health Savings Accounts provide better than
consumption tax treatment to the extent withdrawn amounts are spent on qualified
medical expenses; the contribution to the account is deductible and the withdrawal is
excludable.
9 See I.R.C. § 179.
See I.R.C. § 168(a).
See I.R.C. § 121.
12 See I.R.C. § 103.
13 See I.R.C. § 408A.
14 See I.R.C. § 101.
15 See I.R.C. § 1(h).
2006]
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that this debate misses the point. The key to understanding the
theoretical construct underlying our conception of an "ideal" tax base
- as well as the key to improving current law - is that we wish to
protect from taxation what I shall call "nondiscretionary" income,
while taxing "discretionary" income (in the sense of income available
for discretionary use). This distinction between "discretionary" and
"nondiscretionary" income has significant explanatory force with
respect to several key provisions in our current tax base. Indeed, the
difference between the two kinds of income can perhaps best be
explored by examples drawn from current law.
All amounts spent on consumption would be taxed under either a
theoretically pure income or consumption tax base. Yet, with the
Standard Deductiona6 and the Personal and Dependent Exemption
Deductions, 7 we ensure that a basic amount spent on consumption is
free from tax. Why is that so, if neither an income tax nor
consumption tax base demands it? The reason is that we have
decided that a basic subsistence amount - even though spent on
consumption, and thus taxable under either a pure income or
consumption tax - ought to be free from tax because it is
"nondiscretionary" and thus not fairly available for contribution to
the fisc.
Taking the analysis a step further, this orientation also helps to
explain the Child Tax Credit, 8 a portion of the Earned Income Tax
Credit,' 9 the Dependent Care Credit,20 and perhaps (if less perfectly)
even the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits,2' each of which also
protects from taxation amounts presumably spent on consumption
that would be taxed under either a pure income or a pure consumption
tax. Unlike the Standard Deduction and Personal and Dependent
Exemption Deductions, these go further than merely protecting bare
subsistence amounts from taxation. Nevertheless, they reflect a
concern that certain outlays, though consumption, are
nondiscretionary in an important sense. The Child Tax Credit
apparently reflects the judgment that rearing children today entails a
greater expenditure than is adequately reflected in the Dependent
Exemption Deductions. The Earned Income Tax Credit was
16 See I.R.C. § 63.
17 See I.R.C. §§ 151-152.
18 See I.R.C. § 24.
19 See I.R.C. § 32.
0 See I.R.C. § 21.
21 See I.R.C. § 25A.
[Vol. 25:765
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originally created in part to refund the low-income worker's payroll
taxes.22 Since even the first dollar of wages is taxed under the payroll
tax system, with no Standard Deduction or Personal and Dependent
Exemption Deductions, effectively allowing a refund of these amounts
is consistent with the notion that nondiscretionary income ought to be
protected from tax. In other words, to this extent, the Earned Income
Tax Credit is simply an extension of the idea underlying the Standard
Deduction and Personal and Dependent Exemption Deductions to
the payroll taxes." The Dependent Care Credit recognizes that child
care outlays (and similar outlays for other dependents unable to care
for themselves) incurred in order to allow the person to work outside
the home are also nondiscretionary and thus not available for
contribution to the fisc. Perhaps the most controversial members of
the above list are the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits, since the
decision to engage in higher education seems to be inherently
"discretionary." Yet, as study after study shows the importance of
24higher education to a decent job in this post-manufacturing age,
perhaps Congress has decided that at least a certain amount spent on
higher education is similarly nondiscretionary today.
Now consider the tax-preferred savings vehicles. The three main
sources of savings for the middle class are retirement savings, life
insurance, and home appreciation, each of which would be taxed
under an income tax, but which enjoy more favorable consumption
tax or wage tax treatment under current law. Lesser-used but also
tax-preferred savings vehicles include the Coverdell Education
Savings Accounts 2' and investments in state higher education tuition
savings programs.2' The amounts that can be protected from taxation
See S. REP. No. 94-36, at 11, 33 (1975), reprinted in 1975-1 C.B. 590, 595,603.
23 To the extent that the Earned Income Tax Credit exceeds the taxpayer's
payroll taxes, it is a "welfare" or transfer payment distributed via the Internal
Revenue Code (Code), rather than a true "tax" provision. Professor Lawrence
Zelenak notes that, in 2001, over 80% of Earned Income Tax Dollars represented a
transfer payment rather than an offset to pre-credit tax liability. See Lawrence
Zelenak, The Income Tax and the Costs of Earning a Living, 56 TAx L. REV. 39, 73
(2002). The same is also true to the limited extent that the Child Tax Credit is
refundable.
'4 See, e.g., Lexington: Minding About the Gap, ECONOMIST, June 11, 2005, at 32
(noting that "[tihe gap in income between the college-educated and the non-college
educated rose from 31% in 1979 to 66% in 1997").
See I.R.C. § 530.
26 See I.R.C. § 529. Both the Coverdell Education Savings Accounts and section
529 qualified tuition programs provide better-than-consumption-tax treatment. Not
only are the amounts contributed to the plans deductible but also withdrawals of
2006]
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under these provisions (except life insurance) are capped so that they
are not available to the wealthy in full. If they were not capped and if
they were not limited to the certain kinds of preferred savings that are
mentioned, i.e., if we enacted a "pure" consumption tax that protected
all savings from tax until consumed (or a wage tax that protected all
returns from capital, including all home sale gain, from tax), the
wealthy would be able to shield a much larger portion of their
aggregate income from tax because the wealthy have high savings
rates.27 Indeed, the vast majority of middle-class taxpayers fail to
contribute the maximum allowed to the tax-preferred savings vehicles,
which implies that these limits are not set too low to accommodate
most middle-class taxpayers in saving as much as they choose for
retirement, etc., on a tax-preferred basis (though many commentators
would urge them to save more if they could). For this reason, it is not
too farfetched to say that the middle class operates under a
consumption tax (except that certain nondiscretionary consumption
outlays are not taxed) and the wealthy operate under an income tax
(again, with certain nondiscretionary consumption outlays not taxed),
with the truly poor barely taxed at all. Why do we prevent the
wealthy from having all of their savings protected from current
taxation?
The preferred middle-class savings vehicles can perhaps be
characterized as "nondiscretionary savings," while amounts saved
above the caps are deemed "discretionary" savings, because those
amounts are in excess of that needed to provide a modicum of security
in retirement (or for education or health care). In other words, it is
not the difference between "consumption" and "savings" that matters
here so much as whether the particular savings at issue should be
considered "discretionary" or not.
The notion that the perennial tug-of-war between income and
consumption taxation fails to capture the true underlying value that
informs our choice of tax base was recognized (if inadvertently) by
Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi in their book The Two-
Income Trap.28 They compiled data that compare a 1973 one-earner
(median) couple with a 2000 two-earner (median) couple, each with
two children. Taking into consideration mortgage payments, child-
care expenses, health insurance, and taxes, they show that the two-
income are tax-free to the extent used for qualifying education expenses.
27 See, e.g., Christopher D. Carroll, Why Do the Rich Save So Much?, in DOES
ATLAS SHRUG?: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 465, 476 (Joel
B. Slemrod ed., 2000).
See WARREN & TYAGI,supra note 1.
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income couple in 2000 has $800 less per year in discretionary income
than the one-earner couple in 1973.29 Of particular note, taxes took
24% of the 1973 median family's income while taking 33% in 2000,
even though the discretionary income of the 2000 couple was lower
(though, it was lower in part due to the tax take, which is admittedly
circular).30 If the 2000 couple is a single-earner family, it realizes "a 60
percent drop in discretionary income compared with its one-income
counterpart of a generation ago."31
What do the authors suggest to address this situation? In part,
they suggest switching from income taxation to consumption taxation,
saying "[a]ll savings.., should be exempt from taxes., 32 But they
immediately recognize that such a move would likely be regressive,
since the wealthy "are the only ones with ample savings. 33 I would
add the observation that most savings of the non-wealthy are already
subject to consumption tax treatment. In response, they propose that
"[t]he tax change could be implemented on a sliding scale, so that
those with modest means could save tax free, while the wealthy
continued to be taxed.,
34
Their proposal is so close to current law as to be indistinguishable
from it in its most important respects. The only difference is that,
instead of protecting from current taxation only the middle-class
savings for retirement, education, health care costs, or premature
death, as our current system does, protection would also cover all
savings accounts of the middle class, money which can be spent at any
time for anything.
It seems doubtful that such a change would encourage greater
savings behavior, their stated goal (and the goal of many consumption
tax supporters). The elasticity of savings behavior is a controversial
topic among behavioral economists, but it is fair to say that most think
that the overall savings rate is not very sensitive to tax incentives (or
disincentives), that people choose to save or consume for reasons
having little to do with the after-tax rate of return.36 The personal
29 See id. at 50-52.
30 Id. at 50-51.
31 Id. at 52 (emphasis in original).
32 Id. at 69.
33 Id. at 70.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 69.
36 See, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S
GUIDE TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 180, 232-35 (2d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter SLEMROI & BAKIJA, 2d ed.].
20061
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savings rate has steadily decreased over the same time period during
which increased tax subsidies for savings were enacted. Indeed,
recent research shows that we have reached the crossover point: more
tax revenue was forfeited under the savings subsidies in 2004 ($112
billion) than was saved by individuals for any purpose ($100.8
billion).37 However, this debate is beside the point for our purposes
because the authors' larger concern, although not phrased in these
terms, is that the present tax system should explicitly and more
effectively take into account the decreasing amount of "discretionary"
income earned by today's median earners, as measured empirically
over time. Both their stories and their proposal have at heart an
assumption that the tax system ought to explicitly take into account
the "nondiscretionary" spending and saving required of the median
household and adjust the tax burden, accordingly. I agree.
III. THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION
In 1966, Canada's Royal Commission on Taxation recommended
that the tax burden be "allocated in proportion to the discretionary
economic power of tax units., 38  The Commission defined
"discretionary economic power" as "the product of the tax unit's total
economic power and the fraction of the total economic power
available for the discretionary use of the unit., 31 It defined "tax units"
as "families and unattached individuals," 4 and it defined the "fraction
of the total economic power available for discretionary use" as "the
proportion of the unit's total economic power that does not have to be
exercised to maintain the members of the unit., 4' The Commission
made immediately clear that "[m]aintenance is not synonomous [sic]
with bare, physical subsistence. Rather, it denotes the provision of the
services necessary to maintain the appropriate standard of living of
the family or unattached individual relative to others."' 42 Finally, the
concept of "total economic power" relates to a "comprehensive tax
base," which the Commission said was broader than the income tax
base then in place but which could, for convenience, be called an
37 See Edmund L. Andrews, Savings: Lots of Talk, But Few Dollars, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2005, § 3, at 6 (describing research done by Elizabeth Bell, Adam Carasso,
and C. Eugene Steuerle at the Urban Institute).
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"income" tax base.43 The Commission then gave the following
example:
Suppose that tax unit A has an income of $10,000, and that
one tenth of this income can be spent or not spent at the
discretion of A. Suppose further that B has an income of
$20,000 and two tenths of this income is available for the
discretionary use of B.... [T]he relative taxes imposed on A
and B should be as follows:
fraction available for
tax on A = income of A x discretionary use of A
tax on B income of B x fraction available for
discretionary use of B




From this calculation it follows that the tax on B's income
would be four times the tax on A's income. If a total revenue
of $1,000 is to be raised from A and B, the rate of tax on the
discretionary income of each unit should be 20 per cent (that
is, 20 per cent of $1,000 and $4,000).44
Crucial to the Commission's analysis is the reasonable assumption
that:
[T]he greater the income of the unit the greater is the fraction
available for discretionary use. As illustrated in the foregoing
example, we believe a tax unit with an income of $10,000 has
a smaller proportion of that income available for
discretionary use than an identical family with an income of
$20,000. 45
43 Id. at 5-6; cf. Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of
Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967) (elaborating on the comprehensive
income tax base).
44 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 6-7.
45 Id. at 8.
2006]
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One method that could be used to achieve the desired results
would be "to establish an ascending schedule of proportions of
income that would represent discretionary economic power, and then
subject these to a proportional [i.e., flat-rate] tax., 46 The Commission
conceded that "the fraction of a tax unit's income available for
discretionary use is not an objective phenomenon"47 but rather would
result from the political process. It then gave an example of such an
approach, using a hypothetical flat tax rate of 50% .48
Tax on Discretionary
Discretionary Income Income at an Assumed
Rate of 50%
Income Assumed From Cumulative From Cumulative Marginal Average
Bracket Fraction of Bottom Total to Top Bottom Total to Top Tax Rate Tax Rate
($) Income in to Top of Bracket to Top of of Bracket on on
Bracket of ($) Bracket ($) Income Income at
Available for Bracket ($) in Top of
Discretionary ($) Bracket Bracket
Use (a/%) (b/%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0-195 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
195-390 0.1 20 20 10 10 5 2.5
390-781 0.2 78 98 39 49 10 6.3
781-152 0.3 234 332 117 166 15 10.61,562
1,562- 0.4 626 958 313 479 20 15.3
3,125
3,125- 0.5 1,526 2,520 781 1,260 25 20.2
6,250
6,250- 0.6 3,750 6,270 1,875 3,135 30 25.112,500
12,500- 0.7 8,750 15,020 4,375 7,510 35 30.0
25,000
25,000- 0.8 20,000 35,020 10,000 17,510 40 35.0
50,000
50,000- 0.9 45,000 80,020 22,500 40,010 45 40.0
100,000
100,000- 1.0 100,000 180,020 50,000 90,010 50 45.0
200,000 1 1
The Commission then concluded that "a more familiar method to
achieve the same result would be to apply to a base that measures the
total economic power of each tax unit a schedule of progressive rates
of tax. "49 That is to say, the same tax can be computed by multiplying
46 Id. at 9.
47 Id. at 7.
4 Id. at 11. The reason why the income brackets in the chart reach only
$100,000 to $200,000 is that the Commission assumed that all income in excess of
$100,000 was available for discretionary use. See id. at 8. That is why the
"discretionary income fraction" for that top bracket, which has a floor of $100,000, is
1.0. That 1.0 fraction would continue to apply to all income above that listed in the
chart.
49 Id. at 9.
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the marginal rates in the penultimate column above by the aggregate
income (not limited to "discretionary" income) in each of the brackets
in the first column.
But there is yet a third way, not discussed by the Commission, to
achieve a workable result, which has the added benefit of taking into
account real-life facts regarding nondiscretionary costs. Recall that
the Commission rejected the assumption that nondiscretionary costs
should be limited to those necessary for physical subsistence because
such an approach "would imply that nondiscretionary expenses do not
change with income,"' which "in turn would call for the application of
a constant rate of tax to a base consisting of total income less a fixed
exemption."'" Rather, the Commission believed that "most
nondiscretionary expenses increase, although not proportionately, as
income rises. ''12 That is to say, even though nondiscretionary costs
increase as income rises, the Commission still believed that such costs
did not rise as quickly as income so that "the greater the income of a
tax unit the larger will be the fraction of that income available for
discretionary use."53
While the Commission did not buttress this essential assumption
underlying its analysis with empirical evidence,4 evidence does exist
to support it, which makes building that assumption into a tax
framework a defensible choice. For example, data from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics show that "the share of average annual expenditures
used to purchase food [including meals prepared at home, restaurant
meals, fast food, carryout, and home delivery] declines from 14.9
percent to 11.6 percent as income increases from the third quintile to
the fifth quintile."55  Moreover, "[e]xpenditure shares for housing
clearly decline across income quintiles .... While consumer units in




53 Id. at 6.
54 See, e.g., Michael J. McIntyre, What Should Be Redistributed in a
Redistributive Income Tax?: Retrospective Comments on the Carter Commission
Report, in THE QUEST FOR TAX REFORM: THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION
TWENTY YEARS LATER 189, 202-03 (W. Neil Brooks ed., 1988) (criticizing the
"speculation about the percentage of a taxpayer's income available for discretionary
expenditures").
55 Abby Duly, Consumer Spending for Necessities, in U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY ANTHOLOGY,
2003, REPORT 967 (Sept. 2003) 35, 36 [hereinafter ANTHOLOGY].
2006]
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to shelter and utility costs, those in the lowest income quintile spend
almost 30 percent." 6 In other words, even though households clearly
spend more in absolute terms on food and housing as income rises,
these nondiscretionary outlays do not rise as fast as income rises, with
the result that a larger proportion of additional income is comprised
of discretionary income.
Thus, another way to accomplish the objectives of the
Commission, consistent with these assumptions, would be to exempt
from tax a fixed portion of income that is considered
"nondiscretionary" (no matter what the income level of the
household) but then to apply progressive rates to remaining income
(to reflect the increasing portions of additional income that can
reasonably be considered "discretionary"). The rate of progression
would be a purely political decision, rather than an empirical one, but
it would be imperative to retain a progressive rate structure (even if
only mildly so) if the Nondiscretionary Deduction is to be a flat
amount for all taxpayers.
Moreover, this fixed Nondiscretionary Deduction should be
calibrated to take into account empirical evidence regarding the
median costs for various items, not actual individual taxpayer
expenditures (with the notable exceptions of charitable contributions
and retirement savings), though the elements that sum up to each
taxpayer's Nondiscretionary Deduction (such as whether or not the
taxpayer has children, is a homeowner or renter, or, perhaps, is paying
for college) should reflect the status of that taxpayer.
IV. THE CONTENTS OF THE NONDISCRETIONARY DEDUCTION
In a 2002 article,57 Lawrence Zelenak proposed a universal
Earned Income Allowance for all workers. His proposal can possibly
be seen as a reexamination of the proper scope of "business"
expenses, an argument that, in deciding where the difficult line should
be drawn between deductible "business" expenses and nondeductible
"personal" expenses under an income tax, a portion of what is usually
characterized as "personal consumption" should in fact be deductible
as a cost of doing business (being employed). In that sense, his
proposal is not inconsistent with an "income" tax because business
expenses are unobjectionably deducted under an "income" tax in
order to avoid the double taxation of the same dollars to the same
56 Id. at 36.
57 Zelenak, supra note 23.
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taxpayer. On the other hand, he could be seen as arguing that, even
if the costs of being an employed person are "personal," they ought to
be deductible because not fairly available for contribution to the fisc,
i.e., because (in my nomenclature) they are "nondiscretionary."
In so doing, Professor Zelenak turns to the Consumer
Expenditure Survey59 periodically published by the Department of
Labor to document the costs of commuting, work clothes, and the
extra costs of meals at work.6° He suggests, in the end, a formula-
driven deduction that takes into account the median worker's costs,
rather than actual costs. Whether his use of a formula is based in
theory or is simply the second-best alternative necessitated by
administrative ease is a bit unclear (at least to me) from his article.
With respect to commuting costs, for example, he says:
Of course, some taxpayers incur unnecessarily high
commuting expenses for personal reasons, which suggests that
a deduction for actual commuting expenses would be
theoretically inappropriate -as well as being the source of
major compliance and enforcement difficulties. A better
approach would be a formula-based allowance, which would
permit a working taxpayer to deduct typical commuting
expenses without having to substantiate actual expenses (and
thus without regard to whether the taxpayer's actual expenses
were higher or lower than the deduction produced by the
formula). This approach might be described as assuming
there is no personal element in choosing to have, say, a 10-
mile commute, but that any longer commute is due to
personal considerations. This can achieve only very rough
justice. It is overly generous for the taxpayer who walks to
work, and inadequate for the taxpayer with an unavoidably
58 If every dollar of "gross" business income is included in the tax base and we
disallowed deductions of expenses incurred in producing that income, we would be
double taxing that income to the extent of the denied deductions.
59 More accurately, he cites a book that, in turn, draws on data in the Consumer
Expenditure Survey. Zelenak, supra note 23, at 59-62, citing DAN M. MCGILL, KYLE
N. BROWN, JOHN J. HALEY & SYLVESTER J. SCHIEBER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE
PENSIONS 391-98 (7th ed. 1996).
60 Zelenak, supra note 23, at 45. He also considers whether the allowance
should include the costs of replacing imputed income, such as child care, house
cleaning, yard care, convenience foods, and laundry services, as well as whether the
employee's share of payroll taxes ought to enter into the equation. For reasons that
Zelenak develops in his article, he chooses to focus solely on commuting, work
clothes, and meals at work. See id. at 45-47.
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61lengthy commute.
His statement that a deduction for actual expenses incurred would
be "theoretically inappropriate" but that a formula allowance can
achieve "only very rough justice" seems to be internally inconsistent.
What he may be saying, however, is that it would be ideal if actual
costs (rather than a formula) were used for those whose outlays were
below the median (denying the deduction to the walker, for example),
at or near the median, and above the median to the extent that it
could be shown that the cost was unavoidable. It is only because the
record-keeping attending use of actual cost would be burdensome (for
those below the median) and the determination whether costs were
"necessary" (for those above the median) would be administratively
difficult that he accedes to use of a formula in place of the ideal use of
actual costs. His preference in theory for use of actual costs in most
instances (except those for excessive costs) is apparent in his later
assertion that "considerations of administrative feasibility dictate.., a
formula deduction, rather than a deduction based on each worker's
actual expenses., 62  And: "A formula deduction for work-related
expenses is premised on the notion that it is better to do rough justice
with an easy-to-administer formula than to attempt exact justice by
measuring the actual expenses of each taxpayer.,
63
Zelenak's use of data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
suggests a fruitful avenue for exploring the Nondiscretionary
Deduction that I propose should replace the Standard Deduction, the
Personal and Dependent Exemption Deductions, the Child Tax
Credit, the Deductions for State and Local Income and Property
taxes, as well as some other deductions and credits currently
allowable. If this system is adopted, however, the government will
have to do some further empirical work. Like Professor Zelenak, I
suggest use of a formula allowance that should be modified every
several years based on data collected that documents the median cost
of various nondiscretionary outlays for various-sized households. This
would mean that those who spend less than the median in the
aggregate for the various items composing the Nondiscretionary
Deduction would, in effect, enjoy tax-free savings outside the tax-
preferred vehicles specified under current law, consistent with the
implicit suggestion made by Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren
Tyagi described in Part III, above.
61 Id. at 46-47 (emphasis in original).
62 Id. at 59.
63 Id. at 61 n.102 (emphasis in original).
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For example, assume that median household income is $43,00064
and that the Nondiscretionary Deduction for this household is, say,
$20,000 (because that is the sum of the median costs of the various
items constituting the Nondiscretionary Deduction for this household,
described below). What about those who spend less? Professor
Zelenak would prefer, on principle, to deny the worker who walks to
his job an allowance for the costs of commuting. His formula
allowance would, in fact, grant the walker a commuting allowance but
only because of the administrative difficulty involved in policing those
who spend below the median. But in a tax system that is concerned
with addressing the problems identified by Warren and Tyagi,
allowing the "too generous" Nondiscretionary Deduction to the low-
spending median family accomplishes their stated goal: protecting
from taxation - and thus encouraging - low and middle-class
savings outside the preferred savings vehicles, available for lifetime
use without limit when the unexpected job loss, etc., occurs. A similar
value informs the treatment of households that earn below the median
income, who would nevertheless be allowed the full Nondiscretionary
Deduction based on the costs expended by the median income
household.
A. Shelter
The costs of shelter are an essential ingredient in the
Nondiscretionary Deduction. Current law provides a panoply of tax
reductions for the homeowner, including most notably the triumvirate
of the deduction for "qualified residence interest" on both acquisition
indebtedness and home equity indebtedness," the deduction for state
and local real estate property taxes, even though unconnected with a
66 67trade or business, and the exclusion of most home sale gain. The
tax expenditure totals for the housing subsidies are among the highest
in the Code. The estimates for 2005 (in billions) are: $72.6 for the
home mortgage deduction, $22.9 for the exclusion of capital gains on
sales of principal residences, and $19.6 for the property tax deduction
To be precise, the median household income for both 2002 and 2003 was
$43,318, according to the Census Bureau. See Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D.
Proctor & Robert J. Mills, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the
United States: 2003 at 2 (U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Reports, Report No.
P60-226, Aug. 2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf.
65 See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3).
66 See I.R.C. § 164(a)(1).
67 See I.R.C. § 121.
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68for homeowners. The home mortgage deduction alone is estimated
to cause individual tax rates to be about 7.5% higher than they
otherwise would be.69 There is no explicit tax reduction for the costs
of shelter for the renter, though presumably the Standard Deduction
(taken by virtually all renters) includes some component for shelter
costs. Notice that the Standard Deduction for the renter is a fixed
amount, no matter where the taxpayer lives; a renter in New York
City is entitled to the same Standard Deduction as a renter in rural
Montana, where rents are much lower than in New York City. In this
way, the tax system takes into account the varying costs of shelter due
to geography to a much greater degree for the homeowner than for
the renter.
The current income tax treatment of shelter costs are recognized
by virtually all economists to be dysfunctional. Eugene Steuerle, for
example, observes that "theorists of all types.., especially do not like
the ways that the current income tax system favors owner-occupied
housing over other forms of capital investment."7 ° He notes that "[i]n
a number of economic models, this is one of the larger sources of
inefficiency arising from the income tax.""1 Martin Sullivan is more
blunt when he says that "nowhere is the surrender of economic
principles to political expediency more complete than in the U.S. tax
policy for housing.
72
The distortions are well-known. As Sullivan pithily summarized
them, while focusing in particular on the deduction for home
mortgage interest:
The economic case against the mortgage interest deduction is
clear-cut. It is a huge subsidy that causes massive efficiency-
draining distortions in the economy. Capital and saving
See Martin A. Sullivan, The Economics of the American Dream, 106 TAX
NOTES 407, 409 (2005). In terms of 5-year totals, the deduction for home-mortgage
interest is expected to be the third-highest tax expenditure from 2005 to 2009, coming
in at $434 billion. Only the net exclusion for contributions to and earnings on
employer-provided pension plans ($567 billion) and the exclusions for employer-
provided health care and long-term care premiums ($493 billion) come in higher. See
Dustin Stamper, Last Year's Tax Bills Increase Tax Expenditures - Again, 106 TAX
NOTES 271, 271 (2005).
69 JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 219 (3d ed. 2004) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, 3d ed.].
70 STEUERLE, supra note 2, at 241.
71 Id. at 257 n.5.
72 Sullivan, supra note 68, at 407.
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channeled by the tax code into housing is largely drawn from
the business sector. The mortgage interest deduction means
the economy has less business capital, lower productivity,
lower real wages, and a lower standard of living .... Most
economists understand - but hate to waste their breath
explaining - that probably the most sure-fire way to improve
the competitiveness of the American economy is to repeal the
mortgage interest deduction.
What does the economy get in return for its sacrifice? For the
most part, just bigger houses.7 3
The reason why it makes economic sense for a taxpayer to place
more of his investment dollars in owner-occupied housing (by
purchasing a larger house than he otherwise would) than in other
investment vehicles is that the average tax rate on owner-occupied
housing is a negative 5.1% (due to the tax subsidies described here),
while the average tax rate on all capital returns is 13.8%. 74 The
resulting misallocation of capital exacts efficiency costs. If the
efficiency costs are thought to be necessary in pursuing the quest of
increasing the homeownership rate, we are sorely disappointed here,
as well. Homeownership rates in similar economies, such as Canada
and Australia, are virtually identical to that in America, even though
no home mortgage interest deduction is allowed in these other
countries. Moreover, the value of the subsidies has changed
dramatically over the past several decades as tax rates and interest
rates have fluctuated, but the homeownership rate has remained
remarkably constant at 65 to 70%. 7
The home mortgage deduction is also suspect on fairness grounds.
The upside-down nature of these subsidies is well-known. "Nearly
80% of the benefits from the mortgage-interest and property-tax
deductions go to the top 20% of taxpayers in terms of income ....
Only 5% of the benefits go to people in the bottom 60% of the
73 Id.
74 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TAXING CAPITAL INCOME: EFFECTIVE
RATES AND APPROACHES TO REFORM 8, tbl. 1 (Oct. 2005). The average tax rate on
all capital returns "is strongly influenced by a negative rate" on owner-occupied
housing. In other words, the overall 13.8% average tax rate on capital would be
higher absent the preferred taxation of owner-occupied housing.
75 See Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home
Mortgage Interest Deduction, in 17 TAX POL'Y & THE ECONOMY 37, 40 (James M.
Poterba ed., 2003).
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income scale - those who may be struggling to afford a home. 7 6 As
phrased by Edward L. Glaeser and Jesse M. Shapiro, who recently
published an exhaustive empirical study on the benefits of the home
mortgage deduction, "the home mortgage interest deduction is a
particularly poor instrument for encouraging home ownership because
it is targeted at the wealthy, who are almost always homeowners."77
They find that the "deduction serves mainly to increase housing
consumption [by encouraging people to buy larger houses than they
otherwise would absent the deduction] and to change the
progressiveness of the tax code." '78
They note that the "case for subsidizing housing consumption is
based on a desire either to redistribute income to people who buy a
lot of housing or to encourage people to consume more housing."79
Since they "have little to say about the benefit of redistributing to
those who consume a lot of housing, ,80 they focus on the both the
positive and negative externalities of encouraging people to consume
more housing by buying larger houses than they otherwise would.
While they found some evidence that owning a home and owning a
larger home encourages "aesthetic externalities" (e.g., home
• 81
maintenance and gardening), they found far greater evidence of
negative externalities. For example, the encouragement to buy ever-
larger homes hurts inner cities with older, smaller housing. And
because it disproportionately encourages spending on housing among
81the wealthy rather than the poor, it increases segregation by income.
Another possible side effect of the tax subsidies for owner-
occupied housing is that they artificially inflate the value of housing,
as the subsidies get built into the cost. The real estate industry has
vociferously argued against repeal of these subsidies on the ground
that housing prices would fall. Although that might be considered a
good thing for the renter looking to become a first-time homebuyer, it
would severely disgruntle current homeowners, who tend to vote. For
this reason, even some proponents of a flat tax on wages with no
deductions have relented and conceded that the home mortgage
76 James R. Hagerty, Housing Sector Seeks No Tax Remodeling, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 31, 2005, at A2.
77 Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 75, at 40.
78 Id. at 40.
79 Id. at 50.
8 Id.
81 Id. at 52-56, 64-65.
82 Id. at 58-59.
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interest deduction (if not the property tax deduction) should remain."
President Bush instructed his Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform,
created in January 2005 to submit a report containing revenue neutral
policy options for reforming the Code, to "recogniz[e] the importance
of homeownership ... in American society."84
It is not absolutely clear that home prices would collapse with
repeal of the subsidies. "Britain managed to phase out a similar break
for mortgage interest over 12 years, ending in 2000. There was no
crash in house prices, which kept rising, and no taxpayer revolt." 85
Even so, because I do not propose outright repeal of shelter
deductions, but rather reform, a collapse in home prices is not likely.
I would predict that reductions in value, if any, would be concentrated
at the very high end (where taxpayers today enjoy outsize benefits).
For renters, the portion of the Nondiscretionary Deduction
pertaining to shelter should equal a specified percentage of the sum of
the national median annual rent and the national median annual cost
of utilities paid by renters. For homeowners, the portion of the
Nondiscretionary Deduction pertaining to shelter should equal a
specified percentage of the sum of the national median annual cost of
utilities paid by homeowners, the annual rental value of the national
median-priced home, and the national median annual real estate
property tax for owner-occupied housing. By "specified percentage,"
I mean a selected percentage based on revenue needs, such as, for
example, 40% or 50%. Whichever percentage amount is selected
should be the same for each of the items comprising the
Nondiscretionary Deduction.
For example, the 2000-2001 Consumer Expenditure Survey
(published in 2003) shows that average annual rent paid by middle
quintile renters was $2,588.86 The average annual rent paid by middle
quintile renters would not be the same as the national median rent
paid by all renters. This is because the survey uses the average (for
each quintile) for the total population in that quintile, even if the item
under review was not purchased by all households. In other words,
not everyone in the middle quintile rented their premises; no doubt a
good number were homeowners. Therefore, the average stated rent
for all households in that quintile necessarily understates the rent paid
83 See Sullivan, supra note 68, at 408-09.
Exec. Order No. 13,369, 70 Fed. Reg. 2323 (Jan. 7, 2005).
Hagerty, supra note 76.
86 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT No. 969,
CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SURVEY, 2000-2001, at 11 tbl. 1 (2003) [hereinafter CES].
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87by an average renter in that quintile.
Moreover, the median rent itself may actually be paid by someone
who is not in the median income quintile. Additional empirical work
would, therefore, need to be done; I invoke this data merely to
illustrate the nature of the proposal. For purposes of illustration,
assume that further research shows that the national median annual
rent for those who rent is $7,000. Nationwide surveys of utility costs
are not segregated by "renter" and "homeowner," but average cost to
those in the median quintile for utilities (natural gas, electricity, fuel
oil, telephone, and water) was $2,663. 88 If further study indicates that
the median utility cost to renters was $1,000, then the shelter portion
of a renter's Nondiscretionary Deduction would be a specified
percentage (say, 40%) of $8,000 ($7,000 plus $1,000), or $3,200.
For homeowners, the shelter deduction would not differentiate
between those who use debt to purchase a house and those who don't
(or who have paid off their debt). The 2000-2001 Consumer
Expenditure Survey shows that the average property tax paid by those
in the middle quintile (which, again, likely understates the median
property tax paid by homeowners) was $1,948. 89 Assume that further
research shows the actual median to be $3,000. As of April, 2006,
Internal Revenue Service (Service) data show that the average
nationwide purchase price was $258,700 for new and existing single-
family residences. The annual rental value of this median-price
house would need to be determined and added to the median
property tax. Assume that the annual rental value of this median
house is $16,800 (or $1,400 per month). Finally, the median utility
costs paid by homeowners would need to be added for a final total.
Assume they total $3,200. The shelter portion of a homeowner's
Nondiscretionary Deduction would equal a specified percentage (say,
40%) of this $23,000 total ($3,000 plus $16,800 plus $3,200), or $9,200.
There would be no shelter deduction for a second home, as a second
home could reasonably be considered "discretionary."
These figures would be determined by the government based on
data collected by it every few years so that the amount sheltered from
taxation reflects actual changes in the cost of nondiscretionary
outlays.91 Taxpayers would simply consult a table in the instruction
87 Id. at 9.
88 Id. at 11 tbl. 1.
89 Id.
90 See Rev. Proc. 2006-17, 2006 IRB LEXIS 132 (Apr. 3, 2006).
91 The speed with which the government researched information regarding the
[Vol. 25:765
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booklet for the amount appropriate for their filing status and their
status as a renter or a homeowner. Homeowners would still have an
advantage over renters, as their shelter deduction would no doubt be
significantly higher than the renter's shelter deduction (more than
two-and-a-half times higher, in the hypothetical example), thus
satisfying the President's mandate that the tax law recognize the
importance of homeownership in American society. Nevertheless, it
does away with the unfair upside-down nature of the current
homeowner subsidies and removes the economically inefficient
incentive to buy ever-larger homes. The approach also explicitly
recognizes that renters must spend nondiscretionary dollars on
shelter. Finally, using medians rather than averages prevents the
outsize purchases of the very wealthy to inflate the deductions
severely.92
average state sales tax paid by taxpayers in each of the fifty states after enactment of
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 shows how easily the government should be
able to collect the relevant information. See I.R.S. PUBLICATION 600 (2004), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p600-2004.pdf. The booklet shows the average
sales tax paid by those earning income of $0 to $20,000, $20,000 to $30,000, $30,000 to
$40,000, etc., up to $200,000 (and then over $200,000 as a group) for each of the 50
states and for taxpayers with one, two, three, four, or five exemptions. The Act was
passed in October, and the publication reached people's homes in January.
92 President Bush's Tax Reform panel recommended phasing out the deduction
for home mortgage interest and replacing it with a 15% tax credit. A taxpayer paying
$100 in mortgage interest would credit $15 of that interest against his tax due, the
economic equivalent of deducting that $100 by someone in the 15% tax bracket. In
other words, a taxpayer in the 30% bracket would enjoy the same $15 in tax savings as
someone in the 15% tax bracket, thus eliminating the upside-down nature of the
subsidy under current law. In addition, the interest paid on debt exceeding $227,000
to $412,000 (depending on geographic location) would not be creditable, thus better
targeting the buyer who is on the homeownership margin and eliminating the
inefficient economic incentive to buy ever-larger homes in lieu of more productive
investments for the economy. See http://www.taxreformpanel.gov (for a copy of the
report).
My shelter proposal uses a deduction rather than a credit (and goes well beyond
interest costs) because the proposed Nondiscretionary Deduction defines and refines
the tax base premised on "discretionary income." Tax-base-defining expenditures are
typically cast in the form of deductions, while credits are typically used in the case of
pure tax expenditures, i.e., forms of government spending through the tax law to
provide a subsidy to certain groups or to provide an incentive to change behavior. If
the ideal tax base is considered to be either "income" or "consumption" in traditional
terms, then a tax reduction for housing is a pure tax expenditure. Viewed through
that lens, the Panel's recommendation makes good sense. (Moreover, again viewed
through that lens, an even more efficient proposal to increase the homeownership
rate would be to craft a subsidy targeted solely at first-time home buyers.)
In short, the difference between the approach to shelter costs described in this
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To be entitled to the shelter deduction, homeowners (if
challenged) would need to document their homeownership, and
renters would need to document that they incurred rent.93 Married
homeowners filing jointly would take 100% of the deduction, while
unmarried co-owners filing tax returns as single individuals would
each take 50%. Roommates sharing a rental residence would
similarly split the deduction pro rata. If a renter buys a home, the
taxpayer should, as a simplification matter, be entitled to the larger
"homeowner's" deduction for the entire year, just as new parents are
entitled to a full-year's Dependent Exemption Deduction under
current law for an infant born on December 31.
Note that the proposal described above uses national medians for
the shelter component of the Nondiscretionary Deduction, rather than
state-by-state data (or even regional information within a state,
differentiating between, for example, New York City and upstate
rural New York). This approach applies to other costs discussed
below as well, such as for food and transportation. In fact, this
approach explicitly rejects taking into account the differential costs of
living around the country. The proposal takes as its starting point the
Standard Deduction and Personal and Dependent Exemption
Deductions, which similarly are a uniform, national figure, regardless
of where a taxpayer lives. To the best of my knowledge, it has never
been proposed before that these amounts ought to vary by geographic
location. On the other hand, an argument that the Nondiscretionary
Deduction ought to take into account the geographic differences in
the cost of living is not a trivial one. After all, the annual property tax
due on a $189,000 home (the national median price in January of
2005) was $6,020 in Houston, $1,831 in Mount Vernon, Indiana, and
$876 in Davenport, Florida.94 Therefore, I shall first discuss why a
single, uniform amount for shelter costs might be defensible before
offering an alternative that might prove more politically palatable.
article and the Panel's approach is a deeply theoretical one. My approach attempts to
refine the ideal tax base based on the notion of "discretionary income." The panel's
approach views the home mortgage interest tax subsidy as a non-tax provision that is
merely implemented through the Internal Revenue Code.
93 To prevent abuse, nominal "rent" paid to parents by teenagers with part-time
jobs living at home would not generate a shelter deduction for the teenager. If over-
taxation of teenagers is considered a problem upon replacement of the Standard
Deduction with the multifaceted Nondiscretionary Deduction, Congress could enact
an exclusion of, say, the first $1,000 of earned income from tax for those not entitled
to take the Nondiscretionary Deduction.
94 See Josde Rose, Money's Worth, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2005, at D3.
HeinOnline  -- 25 Va. Tax Rev. 788 2005-2006
The Taxation of Income
At least with respect to higher income taxpayers, it might be
consistent with the fairness constraints assumed in this article (i.e.,
that a tax base consisting of "discretionary income" is fair) to
conclude that choosing where to live is a discretionary choice. A
doctor may choose to practice at Mt. Sinai in New York instead of at
the Cleveland Clinic in Cleveland (or vice versa) because of the
quality of life available in each location and the amenities that each
happens to personally value. The one who chooses to live in
Cleveland may prefer the relatively low cost of living, the Cleveland
Orchestra, and the convenience of upscale, close-in suburbs, while the
doctor who practices in New York may prefer the cultural diversity
and excitement of New York, the New York City Ballet, and the
ability to live in a high-rise building in the heart of it all. If the doctor
ends up choosing New York, with its higher shelter costs, the doctor
has chosen, in a nontrivial sense, to spend more of his or her income
on shelter. The excess of what is actually spent in New York over
what could have been spent in Cleveland (assuming, for this purpose,
that Cleveland shelter costs represent the median) can fairly, in my
view, be considered "discretionary" income and thus fairly within the
tax base.
Using national median costs (and thus ignoring the actual higher
living costs in some locations over others) is contrary to a proposal
advanced by Michael Knoll and Thomas Griffith in a recent article,
where they argued that a "failure to adjust individuals' tax liabilities
for different regional living costs misallocates capital and labor
throughout the economy, discouraging investment and employment in
high-cost regions and encouraging it in low-cost regions."95 They find
this tax-induced disincentive for employers to hire in high-cost regions
inefficient, and they propose a system "designed to ensure that
employees with the same real after-tax income pay the same amount
in tax regardless of where they locate. This can be achieved by
dividing each employee's income by the ratio of her salary to the
equivalent salary in a region with the national average cost of living."
96
The effect of the equation is to exempt from tax "the additional salary
that compensates for the higher cost of living in high-cost regions and
[to tax] the increased purchasing power that compensates for the
lower nominal salary earned in low-cost regions."'
95 Michael S. Knoll & Thomas D. Griffith, Taxing Sunny Days: Adjusting Taxes
for Regional Living Costs and Amenities, 116 HARV. L. REV. 987, 989 (2003).
96 Id. at 1001-02.
97 Id. at 1002. They propose an alternative means of arriving at the same result
using the relative cost of living as the adjustment multiplier.
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If I understand their proposal correctly, this would have the effect
of reducing the nominal tax paid by the investment banker in New
York City (where living costs are high) and increasing the nominal tax
paid by the migrant farm worker in dusty, rural New Mexico (where
living costs are low). They claim that they are focusing solely on
efficiency concerns (and not fairness concerns), and their models seem
to assume that rational employers are avoiding the high-cost locales
and flocking to low-cost locales across the country because of these
tax incentives and disincentives under current law.
Viewed from the perspective of current law, however, their
proposal was not convincing to me - simply because I know of no
empirical evidence supporting these underlying assumptions. It seems
to me that the most notable high-cost areas (such as many areas in
California and New York City) are not seeing a significant exodus of
employers, and the low-cost Midwestern states (such as the Dakotas,
Wyoming, Ohio, Indiana, etc.) are not seeing a huge influx of
residents, notwithstanding the relatively low cost of living. In fact,
anecdotal evidence supports just the opposite migration, continuing
the decades-old exodus from lower-cost rural areas to higher-cost
urban areas. Indeed, small towns such as Crosby, North Dakota,
Ellsworth, Kansas, and Plainville, Kansas, are currently giving away
plots of land and country club memberships to those who move there
as an incentive to attract in-migration. 98
My proposal could be said to discriminate more dramatically in
the way feared by Professors Knoll and Griffith. They would
complain of its economic inefficiency. Whether their fears of an
inefficient exodus from high-cost areas to low-cost areas would
actually transpire simply because of the federal income tax laws is
difficult to predict, as there are so many other factors, including
location of extended family and personal desires, that enter into the
decision of where to live. Indeed, if someone would choose to live in
the high-cost area even though no tax reduction accompanies the
decision, allowing such a reduction would seem to create inefficient
windfall benefits. The key question is why people choose to live
where they do, which is similar to asking why people buy houses
instead of rent. Is it truly the tax benefits that are causing them to
make the decision to buy rather than rent? Would many actually
prefer renting but are buying solely because of the tax treatment of
home ownership? With respect to the Midwest land giveaways noted
98 See Bob Greene, Empty House on the Prairie, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at
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above, one commentator has observed:
[I]f the giveaway programs fail to bring about a new land
rush, maybe it will be no one's fault. The United States is no
longer quite so young a country; we've been here a while, and
nations, like people, get set in their ways. If the great urban-
rural population divide stays the way it is, it may be because
we all have chosen to live this way, and are not about to
change. 99
If, however, this concern is considered sufficiently serious to warrant a
response in the tax law even for high-income taxpayers, who
presumably have more mobility than low- and middle-income
taxpayers, the median costs could be considered state-by-state, similar
to the state-by-state sales tax data issued by the Service under section
164(b)(5)(H).2 °°
The case in which the argument is persuasive to me that the
higher living costs incurred in some geographic locations cannot fairly
be considered incurred by choice is that of low- and middle-income
workers - for example, the janitor in New York City. But the
appropriate response may not necessarily be to adjust the national
"median" that is taken into account in the Nondiscretionary
Deduction (which would apply to the benefit of high- and low-wage
workers alike). Rather the appropriate response would be to increase
the "specified percentage" of the national median that is deductible
by those who live in a "high-cost" area but who earn less than a
specified amount, since those are the taxpayers for whom the choice
of geographic location may not be "discretionary." For example, if
the generally applicable "specified percentage" that can be deducted
of the national median is 40% for most taxpayers, perhaps that
percentage can be increased to 50% for those who live in specified
"high-cost" areas and who earn less than, say, $100,000 or earn less
than twice the median wage for the high-cost state (or the
metropolitan area). The number-crunching would, once again, simply
be reflected in applicable tables prepared by the government.
A final refinement to the shelter portion of the Nondiscretionary
Deduction should be to calculate the components described above
(median property taxes, rental value of median-priced home, and
median utilities for homeowners, and median rent and utilities for
renters) for households containing various numbers of children and
99 Id.
100 See supra note 91.
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other dependents. That is to say, instead of adjusting for the
additional costs of children through a separate Dependent Exemption
Deduction and Child Tax Credit, the components of the
Nondiscretionary Deduction itself could be adjusted directly to
account for family size. The goal would be, once again, to capture
more accurately the median cost changes in the various components
that comprise the Nondiscretionary Deduction that arise with each
new child. The median home price for a married couple with four
children, for example, is surely significantly higher than the median
home price for a single individual.' For example, the 2000-2001
Consumer Expenditure Survey shows that average total annual
housing cost for all households containing one person was $8,371, for
households containing two persons was $12,944, and so on to $17,317
for households with five or more persons.102
The current analogy would be to the sales tax tables under section
164(b)(5)(H) published by the Service. The government gathered
empirical information regarding the sales tax experience of taxpayers
in each of the fifty states by household size.'03 For each state, there
are six columns, with the first showing the sales tax deduction for
households with one exemption, the second column showing the sales
tax deduction for households with two exemptions, and so on until the
sixth column, which shows the sales tax deduction for households with
more than five exemptions. While I do not recommend as my first
choice state-by-state determinations, I do recommend the
determination of median outlays for households of varying sizes with
respect to each component of the Nondiscretionary Deduction.
Finally, what about the gain from the sale of a primary residence,
currently excludable to the extent of $500,000 for a married couple
and $250,000 for single individuals? Gain from the sale of a home,
like gain from the sale of any other asset, should be taxed to the
extent it is considered "discretionary" income, which generally means
that it should be taxed to the extent that it (and other income) exceeds
101 Although the decision whether or not to have children can, on some level, be
considered "discretionary," with the higher living costs associated with children thus
viewed as "discretionary," I assume that the current political and social pressures to
recognize the increased costs associated with children as "nondiscretionary" will
continue and thus incorporate this view into my proposal.
102 See CES, supra note 86, at 23 tbl. 4. These numbers do not reflect the
medians that I suggest be used for each category, but they are emblematic of the
phenomenon.
103 See I.R.S. PUBLICATION 600 (2004), supra note 91.
104 See I.R.C. § 121.
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the amount of the taxpayer's Nondiscretionary Deduction (and other
available deductions) for the year. Artificially channeling excessive
investment dollars into homes instead of stock or business assets
because the gain on the sale of this asset will be tax-free (while the
gain on business and investment assets will be taxed) results in an
inefficient allocation of investment dollars, as described earlier.
Nevertheless, even if reducing gain on asset sales by the amount
representing inflation gain may be unwise for assets generally
(discussed below in Part V), the gain on sales of homes could easily be
reduced by the amount that represents merely inflation gain between
the year of purchase and the year of sale so that only the portion
representing a real wealth accession is taxed.'05
The simple tax reporting form that would be completed for the
sale of a primary residence would first instruct the taxpayer to
calculate realized gain using adjusted basis and amount realized, as
under current law. The form could then easily include a table listing
every year for the last, say, 100 years with its corresponding
cumulative inflation adjustor percentage. The taxpayer would be
instructed to multiply the realized gain on sale by the cumulative
inflation adjustor percentage listed beside the year the home was
purchased, which would be close to 100% for homes purchased in the
year before sale and would progressively diminish the longer the
home was held (as more of the gain represents inflation). The
government would determine these percentages, and a decision would
have to be made whether to use the increase in prices generally each
year (such as increases in the consumer price index) or to use the
increase in median home prices each year. Whichever choice is made,
greater accuracy regarding the amount of the taxpayer's true wealth
accession can be had in this context with little administrative
difficulty. Conversely, a blanket exclusion of all gain for most
taxpayers is inconsistent with the conceptual rationale developed in
this article.
105 Some of the objections pertaining to inflation indexing for asset basis in
general, including the unacceptable arbitrage that would easily occur if we indexed
asset basis but did not index debt basis, see infra note 199 and accompanying text,
would not be a problem in this particular context, as there would be no more home
mortgage interest deduction per se. Moreover, sales of homes (unlike assets
generally) are relatively infrequent, and simplifying conventions could be used in
determining the cumulative inflation adjustor percentage that would be multiplied by
the sale gain, such as assuming that the home was purchased and sold precisely in the
middle of the year (rather than on the date actually sold and purchased). For all of
these reasons, there should be no conceptual or administrative objection to
eliminating taxation of inflation gain in this limited context.
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B. Food
The 2000-2001 Consumer Expenditure Survey shows that the
average annual cost for food for households in the median quintile
was $5,042. This includes households of all sizes and includes both
food eaten at home ($3,113) and food eaten away from home ($1,929).
It does not include the cost of alcoholic beverages, which averaged
$331 for households in the median quintile.' °6
Since everyone must eat, the downward bias described earlier for
rent is likely less pronounced. Moreover, the average expenditure for
those in the median quintile is also likely close to the actual median
expenditure for food nationally. But the amounts listed above are for
each "consumer unit," essentially each householdY°7  No
differentiation is made between single-individual households and, for
example, households containing a married couple with five children.
Data adjusted for household size is presented for all households, in
the aggregate, but not for median households of each size. For
example, the average annual food costs (both eaten at home and
away) for one-person households in the survey year was $2,835, for
two-person households was $5,291, and for households with five or
more persons was $8,194.108
Just as suggested with respect to the shelter component of the
Nondiscretionary Deduction, the median amount spent on food
should be determined for various household sizes. Since eating food
prepared outside the home might reasonably be considered
"discretionary," these median amounts could reasonably be limited to
food eaten at home (extrapolating the annual cost for all food by
reference to the daily cost for food prepared and eaten at home).°9
106 For each of the items in this paragraph, see CES, supra note 86, at 10-11.
107 See id. at 235.
108 See id. at 22.
109 As an interesting aside, the CES found that, expressed in percentage terms,
the expenditure share for food is greater for husband-and-wife-only consumer units
(13.2%) than for those with young children (11.5%). The researchers attribute this
difference to a decline in eating outside the home, as parents of young children might
not eat outside the home as often as, or in restaurants as expensive as, couples
without children. See ANTHOLOGY, supra note 55, at 35, 37. Using only the data for
in-home eating and extrapolating the annual costs from that data would ensure that
the couple with young children is not penalized (or, phrased alternatively, that the
childless couple is not unduly favored). "The expenditure shares for food at home are
roughly equivalent for husband-and-wife consumer units (7.5 percent) and
households with children under 6 years of age (7.2 percent). However, the former
allocate 5.7 percent of total spending to food away from home while the latter
[Vol. 25:765
HeinOnline  -- 25 Va. Tax Rev. 794 2005-2006
The Taxation of Income
As before, the food portion of the taxpayer's Nondiscretionary
Deduction would be a specified percentage (say, 40%) of the amount
determined for the appropriate household size. As with the shelter
component of the Nondiscretionary Deduction, the taxpayer would
simply look up the proper amount in a table prepared by the
government. Only taxpayers who are eligible to deduct the shelter
component of the Nondiscretionary Deduction would be eligible to
take the food portion of the Nondiscretionary Deduction. This would
prevent teenagers living at home with earnings from a part-time job
from deducting the costs of food, since his or her parent or parents
would deduct the proper amount for the entire household.10°
C. Transportation
Essential transportation costs should also be considered
nondiscretionary. Overall, "[t]ransportation costs make up a large
part of a consumer's budget," and data from the year 2000 "indicate
that 88 percent of all consumer units either owned or leased a vehicle,
and expenditures for leasing and purchasing... vehicles made up
almost 10 percent of the average consumer unit's total
expenditures.""'
Data collected by the Consumer Expenditure Survey describe the
average costs for vehicle purchases for the year for all households,
vehicle expenses (such as maintenance and repair costs and
insurance), and the costs of public transportation. Since not all
households purchased a car in the survey year, the average purchase
cost for households in the median quintile ($7,538) would grossly
understate the average cost for those households that actually bought
a car or truck. Similarly, the average cost for public transportation for
households in the median quintile ($275) would understate the
average cost of those households relying primarily on public
transportation. The average cost of maintenance and repairs for those
in the median quintile ($698) is probably pretty close to the national
median for car-owners, since 88% of households own or lease a car.
The same is probably true of car insurance costs ($826).112
One might initially suggest that the best figure to use for purposes
of the transportation portion of the Nondiscretionary Deduction
allocated just 4.3 percent." Id. at 37 n.10.
110 See supra note 93.
I Laura Paskiewicz, The Cost and Demographics of Vehicle Acquisition in
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 55, at 61 (citations omitted).
112 For each of the items in this paragraph, see CES, supra note 86, at 11-12 tbl. 1.
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might be a specified percentage (say, 40%) of the annual lease cost of
a 3- or 4-year old median-priced American model automobile, plus
the median annual maintenance, insurance, and gasoline costs. The
costs associated with a newer or more expensive model of car or truck
could reasonably be considered discretionary. Alternatively, the
transportation portion of the Nondiscretionary Deduction could use
the median annual cost of public transportation for those households
relying primarily on public transportation. Because public
transportation is not readily available in many locales in the United
States, however, it surely would not be accurate to say that using
private transportation is more often than not a discretionary choice.
The most difficult issue in connection with transportation costs
would be the adjustment for household size, and this difficulty might
implicate the choice above regarding whether to use the lease cost of a
car or the costs of public transportation. Consumer Expenditure
Survey data shows that the average total transportation costs, in the
aggregate, do differ by household size. For example, the average total
cost for one-person households is $4,012, while the average cost for
households containing five or more persons is $11,123.113 (These
numbers do not reflect medians but rather the average for all
households and include outlays in addition to lease costs,
maintenance, gasoline, and insurance.) These differences might arise,
for example, if a household contains a dependent teenager with his or
her own car to drive to a part-time job as well as a car for each adult.
The difficulty here is gleaning whether the ownership of multiple cars
is reasonably considered "discretionary" or whether each filing
household should be limited to the deduction associated with only one
car.
For this reason, the transportation portion of the
Nondiscretionary Deduction might be best defined, after all, by a
specified percentage (say, 40%) of the annual median cost to a single
adult individual who uses primarily public transportation. A married
couple filing jointly would be entitled to two shares, while single
individuals would be entitled to one, with half shares allocated for
each dependent in the household.!14  I find this to be the least
satisfying result of the Nondiscretionary Deduction portions discussed
so far (shelter, food, and transportation), but administrative necessity
113 Id. at 23 tbl. 4.
114 As with the shelter and food portions of the Nondiscretionary Deduction, the
teenager living at home with earnings from a job would not get the deduction; it
would go to the parent or parents.
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may not provide a reasonable alternative.
D. Apparel
The 2000-2001 Consumer Expenditure Survey lists the average
annual costs of apparel for men aged sixteen and over, for boys aged
two to fifteen, for women aged sixteen and over, for girls aged two to
fifteen, for children under two, and in the aggregate.1 5 It also lists the
same information for households of various size. For example,
households containing one person paid on average $862 for apparel,
while households containing five or more persons paid on average
$2,893.116
The apparel portion of the Nondiscretionary Deduction should be
a specified percentage (say, 40%) of the median apparel costs for
households of varying sizes, as described above.
E. Work Expenses
Professor Zelenak's article discussed earlier recommended
adopting an Earned Income Deduction to account for the increased
expenses incurred by workers. His recommended deduction would
account for the expenses associated with commuting, work clothes,
and meals at work."7 What about child-care expenses for the single
working parent or the two-earner married parents? Because he
concludes that "the tax treatment of child care expenses is best
analyzed in the context of the overall income tax treatment of families
with children," he declared the expenses to be outside the scope of his
article"
8
Because the Nondiscretionary Deduction already includes
components pertaining to the median costs of transportation, apparel,
and food, allowing an add-on deduction for workers would likely be
"double counting" to some extent. This is not entirely true; I
specifically suggested, for example, that the food component should
be calculated by using only the cost of food prepared at home. And
the "median" data concerning transportation and apparel costs would
contain not only workers (leading to double counting) but also
nonworkers, so the "median" may be weighted on the low side for a
115 See CES, supra note 86, at 11. The survey also lists the cost of footwear. See
id.
1,6 See id. at 23 tbl. 4.
117 Zelenak, supra note 23, at 45.
18 Id. at 48.
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full-time worker. Nevertheless, because the Nondiscretionary
Deduction does contain explicit allowances for specified percentages
of transportation, apparel, and food costs for the median taxpayer, it
seems less pressing to allow an add-on deduction for workers with
respect to these expenses.
With respect to the costs of child (and other dependent) care,
however, I think the Nondiscretionary Deduction approach may be
fruitful. Currently, section 21 provides a tax credit for specified
portions of dependent-care expenses incurred because of work, and
section 129 allows exclusion of certain employer-provided dependent
care.119 Because amounts spent on child and dependent care in order
to allow one to work could reasonably be considered
"nondiscretionary" costs, the section 21 credit could be replaced by a
deduction (another component of the taxpayer's Nondiscretionary
Deduction) equal to a specified portion (say, 40%) of the median
costs incurred for such care. It would be a deduction, rather than a
credit, because it defines and refines the tax base premised on
"discretionary income." Tax-base defining outlays are usually cast in
the form of deductions, while credits are typically used only in the• 120
case of pure tax expenditures. As with the other components of the
Nondiscretionary Deduction, the taxpayer would simply look up the
appropriate amount from a table containing empirical data regarding
the median costs for the care of the appropriate number of
dependents.
As with the shelter component of the Nondiscretionary
Deduction, the taxpayer would have to retain records indicating that
amounts were, indeed, spent on child care costs. Perhaps the taxpayer
would need to show that a specified statutory minimum was spent to
be entitled to any deduction; if the minimum was spent, the median
cost would be allowed, whether the amount actually spent was higher
or lower.
F. Education
In addition to the tax benefits aimed at education providers (such
as the possibility of tax exemption under section 501121 and the ability
to receive deductible charitable contributions under section 17012),
there are a panoply of tax subsidies aimed at individuals who are
119 See I.R.C. §§ 21,129.
120 See supra note 92.
121 See I.R.C. § 501.
122 See I.R.C. § 170.
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saving or paying for higher education. 12 Tax benefits for current
expenses include the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits,24 exclusion
of certain employer-provided education assistance,' 25 and the
exclusion for qualified scholarships and tuition reductions. 26 Tax-
favored savings vehicles for higher education include so-called section
12712529 plans l, Coverdell education savings accounts, 28 and education
129
savings bonds. In addition, student loan interest can generally be130 I131
deducted,"3 and certain student loan forgiveness can be excluded.
The five-year tax expenditure total for these provisions for 2004
through 2008 is estimated to be nearly $50 billion.132
The extent to which the costs of higher education should be
considered "discretionary" or "nondiscretionary" is debatable. These
costs are inherently different from the costs of shelter and food, which
must be incurred to live in a humane and dignified manner. Millions
of adults with only a high-school education lead productive and
satisfying lives in jobs that provide a living wage. However, these jobs
are decreasing over time, with employers increasingly looking for
additional analytical, writing, and technology skills obtained chiefly
through higher education. Does this mean that the costs of higher
education should be considered "nondiscretionary" to some extent
today? Ultimately, that determination is for Congress to make. If
Congress resolves this question in the affirmative, then the question
becomes how to implement that decision within the Nondiscretionary
Deduction mechanism set forth in this article.
13 See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., PRESENT
LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX BENEFITS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, JCX-52-
04 (July 21, 2004) [hereinafter JCT EDUCATION] (describing and analyzing the various
tax subsidies).
124 See I.R.C. § 25A.
125 See I.R.C. § 127.
126 See I.R.C. § 117. In addition, Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 details when education
costs can be deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense.
127 See I.R.C. § 529.
128 See I.R.C. § 530.
129 See I.R.C. § 135.
130 See I.R.C. § 221.
131 See I.R.C. § 108(f).
132 See JCT EDUCATION, supra note 123, at 2.
133 If Congress concludes that spending on higher education is discretionary, it
may still make a non-tax policy decision to subsidize higher education for other
reasons, such as the perceived positive externalities for society at large. Tax
expenditure evaluation generally entails cost-benefit analysis. For instance, is the tax
subsidy an efficient mechanism to produce the non-tax benefit sought? Is the aim of
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If the costs of higher education are to be considered
"nondiscretionary," then the amount that should be allowed as a
component of the Nondiscretionary Deduction should be computed in
a manner that is different from the manner described above for other
components of the Nondiscretionary Deduction. For other items, I
recommended that a specified percentage of the median costs spent
by households of varying sizes be used to define the deduction
amount. With respect to education costs, however, that approach
would allow the costs of private education to affect the median.
Instead, I would key the amount allowed to the average cost of public
colleges and universities on the reasonable assumption that a decision
to attend a private rather than a public institution is surely
discretionary.
Tuition and fees at both public and private colleges and
universities have generally risen faster than the rate of inflation since
1981, due in part to decreasing levels of government funding for
higher education.114 For the 2002-2003 academic year, the average
cost of tuition and fees at four-year private colleges and universities
was $16,948, at four-year public institutions was $4,059, at two-year
private colleges was $10,755, and at two-year public colleges was
$1,479."' In 2001, approximately 61% of college students were
enrolled in four-year institutions, and 77% of college students were
enrolled in public institutions. 36
For students enrolled full-time in a degree-granting program at a
four-year institution, they (or their parents, but not both) would be
allowed to deduct (as a component of their Nondiscretionary
Deduction) a specified amount (say, 40%) of the average tuition and
the tax benefit to provide a subsidy (transfer to needy) or an incentive (effect change in
behavior)? In either case, what is the optimal design for the policy to be effective,
without providing undue windfalls (benefits for behavior that taxpayers would engage in
anyway)? Is the tax system the best vehicle to implement the policy? Would we care if
the tax benefits are captured by educational institutions, which may raise tuition costs
and fees if they are deductible or creditable? Does it matter what the institutions do
with the extra cash , e.g., to provide more scholarships to needy students or to raise
professors' salaries? Do we care about progressivity considerations? Do we care that
many people who go to college would have gone even without the tax benefit? Do we
care that the most needy students and parents are outside the tax system? And so on.
134 See JCT EDUCATION, supra note 123, at 35 ("Federal funds have remained
relatively constant, State and local funding has declined, tuition and fees have




HeinOnline  -- 25 Va. Tax Rev. 800 2005-2006
The Taxation of Income
fees for four-year public institutions ($4,059 for 2002-2003). 13' For
those enrolled full-time in a degree-granting program at a two-year
institution, the amount would be keyed to the average tuition and fees
for two-year public institutions ($1,479 for 2002-2003). For those
enrolled part-time, the allowance would be reduced by half. Since the
decision to go on to graduate school can fairly be considered
"discretionary," no deduction would be allowed for post-graduate
education in the Nondiscretionary Deduction. In addition, no
deduction would be allowed to the extent that expenses are paid for
with withdrawals from the tax-preferred savings vehicles available
under current law (or by an excludable scholarship). The Hope and
Lifetime Learning Credits in section 25A would be repealed.
G. Health Care
As with education costs, the Code contains a panoply of
provisions dealing with health care costs, including the exclusion for
employer-provided health care and health insurance,"" the deduction
of health insurance costs by the self-employed,139 the deduction of
medical expenses (including health insurance paid by employees who
are not provided health insurance by their employers) to the extent
that they exceed 7.5% of the taxpayer's Adjusted Gross Income,' 40
and health savings accounts. 14 1 The latter allows the taxpayer to
establish a savings account with before-tax dollars on which the
earnings are also excluded to the extent used to pay for medical142
expenses. In order to establish the account, the taxpayer must
obtain a high-deductible insurance policy satisfying various criteria.
Some (though not all) health care costs could certainly be
considered "nondiscretionary" in the sense used in this article. Unlike
education, certain health care interventions are necessary for life to
continue. For that reason, the costs of some medical care are like the
costs of basic sustenance. But the approach taken in this article for
other nondiscretionary costs would seem inappropriate for the costs of
137 Room and board would not factor into the deduction because the shelter and
food components of the Nondiscretionary Deduction account for them already.
138 See I.R.C. § 106.
139 See I.R.C. § 162().
140 See I.R.C. § 213.
141 See I.R.C. § 223.
142 Thus, the taxpayer receives better than consumption-tax treatment (both
expensing of the investment, as under a cash-flow consumption tax, and exclusion of
the investment returns, as under a wage tax).
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health care. With respect to shelter or food, for example, one can
persuasively argue that costs incurred above the median are fairly
considered "discretionary" and thus should not enter into the
Nondiscretionary Deduction. Health care, however, is different by its
very nature. The cost of a triple bypass operation for a particular
taxpayer may well result in an outlay far above the overall median
health care costs for the comparable household for the year. But it is
extremely doubtful that the amount spent above the median for the
open-heart surgery could be fairly considered spent purely by choice
in the same sense that food or housing costs in excess of the median
can be said to be "discretionary." The approach taken in current
section 213, which allows deduction of all costs above 7.5% of the
taxpayer's Adjusted Gross Income, 143 may actually be a better
approach to defining "nondiscretionary" outlays in the unique context
of health care costs. At the same time, I should stress that this
approach (allowing a deduction to the extent outlays exceeded a
defined percentage of Gross Income or Adjusted Gross Income)
would clearly not be appropriate in determining the other components
of the Nondiscretionary Deduction, as it would allow deduction of
amounts that surely could fairly be categorized as "discretionary."
Health care simply seems to be different in kind.
In any event, this very difference, as well as the extremely difficult
policy conundrums that extend far beyond the tax world raised by our
health-care financing system, suggest that comprehensive tax
treatment of health care costs is beyond the scope of this article.
H. Charitable Contributions
Charitable contributions are deductible to the extent provided in
section 170. A person taking the Standard Deduction instead of the
collection of Itemized Deductions is not allowed to deduct charitable
contributions separately, though the Standard Deduction presumably
represents in part the average taxpayer's charitable contributions.
143 As discussed in Section K, infra, the Nondiscretionary Deduction approach
would make possible the elimination of the distinction between Itemized and Above-
the-Line deductions, with its concomitant notion of Adjusted Gross Income. Section
213 could be amended to allow deduction of amounts expended in excess of a defined
percentage of Gross Income (or Gross Income less the Nondiscretionary Deduction).
For reasons similar to those discussed with respect to health care, I do not
recommend that the personal casualty loss deduction in sections 165(c)(3) and (h) be
folded into the Nondiscretionary Deduction.
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The charitable contribution deduction should not be subsumed
within the Nondiscretionary Deduction but should remain as a
separate deduction that is defined by the actual amount contributed to
charity. The reason for this treatment is that this deduction is
primarily intended to change behavior by encouraging ever-larger
gifts to charity, which in part can replace government spending and,
even where it does not (e.g., contributions to churches), is also
thought to produce sufficient positive externalities to warrant the
behavioral incentive. Allowing deduction for only the median
contributions for households of varying sizes (and denying deduction
for amounts in excess of the median) would be inconsistent with the
deduction's very premise. That is not to say that serious reform of the
deduction is unnecessary.144 It is sufficient for this article, however, to
note why collapsing the charitable contribution deduction into the
Nondiscretionary Deduction is not appropriate.
L Retirement Savings (Outside Social Security)
As briefly described in Part II, tax-preferred retirement savings
vehicles include (among some lesser-used plans) the exclusion or
deduction for contributions to qualified pension plans,'45 so-called
section 401(k) and 403(b) plans,146 and IRAs.1 47 The contributions to
these plans are excludable or deductible, and withdrawals are
includable. In other words, these are cash-flow consumption tax
provisions. Contributions to so-called Roth IRAs148 are also tax-
preferred, though in a different way. The contribution to the account
is not deductible, but all earnings are excludable when withdrawn, as
under a wage tax. Each of these tax-preferred retirement savings
vehicles have ceilings that limit the amount that can be contributed
each year. In this way, the more favorable cash-flow consumption tax
or wage tax treatment applies to the retirement savings of the middle
and lower classes but does not allow the truly wealthy, who have
sufficient discretionary income to save in amounts far in excess of the
various ceilings, to shelter all of their savings from tax. Indeed, I
argued in Part II that this system is a persuasive illustration of the
value implicitly underlying the tax base of the current Code: that
144 See, e.g., Gene Steuerle, A Win-Win Option for Charity and Tax Policy, 107
TAX NOTES 361 (2005) (surveying several common-sense reform options).
145 See I.R.C. §§ 401-418E.
146 See I.R.C. §§ 401(k), 403(b).
147 See I.R.C. § 219.
148 See I.R.C. § 408A.
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discretionary income ought to be fully taxed but that nondiscretionary
income, which represents amounts not fairly available for contribution
to the fisc, should be protected. Under a pure "income" tax, all
savings would be taxed - even the retirement savings of the poor and
middle classes. Under a pure "consumption" tax, no savings - even
the discretionary savings of the truly wealthy - would be tapped.
The current compromise illustrates our desire to protect and
encourage the middle and lower classes to save for their retirement
(by extending more favorable consumption or wage tax treatment to
those savings) because such savings, even though they would be
currently taxed under an "income" tax, fairly represent
"nondiscretionary" income. At the same time, we wish to tax the
large savings pools of the wealthy that exceed the prescribed ceilings
(as under a true income tax) because those savings fairly represent
"discretionary" income.
Like the charitable contribution deduction, these provisions
depend on the behavioral incentive-here, to save specifically for
retirement. Even if the aggregate level of savings is not increased in
the middle class because of these provisions, there is likely shifting
from taxable savings accounts to these tax-preferred accounts.
Because these preferred accounts generally cannot be tapped before
retirement age without severe tax penalties, they likely succeed in
protecting some savings for retirement that would otherwise suffer
early withdrawal for pre-retirement consumption. For this reason,
these retirement savings provisions should also not be subsumed
within the Nondiscretionary Deduction but should remain separate
and keyed to actual contributions. Allowing deduction for only the
median contributions for households of varying sizes (and denying
deduction for amounts in excess of the median) would pervert the
deduction's individual behavioral incentive to save to the maximum
allowed under the applicable ceiling.
J. State and Local Income and Sales Taxes and Federal Payroll Taxes
Real estate property taxes paid by homeowners would be
subsumed within the shelter component of the Nondiscretionary
Deduction, as described earlier. How should state and local income,
sales, and personal property taxes be treated?
State income taxes are mandatory extractions imposed by state
and local governments and thus could be considered
"nondiscretionary" at least to some extent. Sales taxes on luxury
items can clearly be considered "discretionary" outlays because the
[Vol. 25:765
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purchase of luxury items is itself a discretionary choice. The purchase
of basic necessities, such as food and shelter, may not be considered
discretionary, but these purchases are also often free of state and local
sales tax. Some states also impose personal property taxes, such as on
automobiles. Finally, some states choose to substitute sales taxes for
income taxes, a decision that prompted the 2004 enactment to allow
taxpayers to deduct either their state and local income taxes or sales
149taxes (but not both).
The Nondiscretionary Deduction should contain a separate
component for state and local taxes (other than real property taxes)
paid by individuals. It should equal a specified portion (say, 40%) of
the median state and local tax (other than real property taxes) paid by
households of various sizes, as described above for other components
of the Nondiscretionary Deduction. As I recommended with respect
to the shelter component of the Nondiscretionary Deduction, my
primary recommendation would be to allow a single median (for each
household size) for taxpayers across the country. Also as described
earlier, state-by-state tables could be computed, instead, if political
necessity dictates, or low- and middle-income taxpayers in specific
high-tax localities could be allowed to deduct a higher "specified
percentage" of the national median. Allowing the national (or state)
median of state and local taxes to govern the amount deducted,
regardless whether they take the form of income, sales, or personal
property taxes, avoids what may be seen as an inappropriate (from a
federalist perspective) entanglement of the federal government in the
decision of states regarding how best to raise revenue.
What about federal payroll taxes? In an earlier article, 50 I argued
that the employee portion of the payroll tax burden on labor income
ought to be explicitly integrated with the income tax burden on labor
income, and I explored the various means of accomplishing that. I
argued that the payroll tax (composed primarily of the Social Security
and Medicare taxes) was a true "tax" and that imposing two federal
taxes on labor income masks the higher federal effective combined tax
rate on the labor income of the lower and middle classes. This is
particularly true since the payroll tax, unlike the income tax, has no
Personal Exemption Deduction or Standard Deduction that protects a
certain amount of nondiscretionary income from taxation (though I
did not use the rubric of "discretionary" and "nondiscretionary" back
149 See I.R.C. § 164(b)(5) (which expired at the end of 2005).
150 See Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and
Payroll Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2002).
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then); the first dollar earned is taxed.
I recommended that employees be permitted to deduct from
Gross Income under the income tax a portion of payroll taxes paid
(equal to a reasonable Personal Exemption amount, representing
nondiscretionary income).' Under the view that the earlier payment
was a true "tax," later receipt of cash Social Security payments in
retirement would be fully includable, contrary to current law (though
the value of medical care received in kind under the Medicare
program would not be included, as under current law). The taxpayer's
Nondiscretionary Deduction in retirement would protect that portion
of the cash payment that is fairly considered nondiscretionary income,
which may well be all of it. But to the extent that it is considered
discretionary income because it is not sheltered by the
Nondiscretionary Deduction, or other deductions, it should be taxed.
Because of the income tax revenue that would be lost, however, I
conceded in 2002 that adoption of my recommendation was politically
unlikely. I therefore suggested (and recently reiterated 12) that a
politically achievable alternative might be to raise the Social Security
tax wage ceiling, currently set at $94,000, and slash the marginal rates
as low as possible to retain revenue neutrality, while retaining the
payment formula as it is today. With lower marginal rates, the
multiple tax burden on the labor income of the lower and middle
classes would not be as problematic. On the other hand, if done in
conjunction with the kind of far-reaching changes recommended in
this article, direct integration of the two taxes might well be possible.
K. Final Thoughts on the Nondiscretionary Deduction
The Nondiscretionary Deduction proposed here would be, some
might argue, nothing more than a refined Standard Deduction
conflated with the Personal and Dependent Exemption Deductions
and the Child Tax Credit. In one sense, they would be right, if the
role of those Deductions and Credit is chiefly to exempt from taxation
amounts not fairly available for contribution to the fisc, even though
spent on consumption. But the form of the proposed
Nondiscretionary Deduction is important for three reasons.
151 Alternatively, I argued that a portion of the employee payroll tax could be
credited against the income tax. See id. at 56-64 (discussing both the deduction and
credit alternatives).
152 See Deborah A. Geier, The Payroll Tax Liabilities of Low- and Middle-
Income Taxpayers, 106 TAX NOTES 711 (2005).
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The first is one of cognitive perceptions. Explicitly identifying the
various components of the Nondiscretionary Deduction, such as the
shelter component, the state and local tax component, the food
component, etc., and having taxpayers sum up their allowable
portions based on the number of dependents by looking at tables for
each type of component, explicitly battles perceptions that "no
deduction is allowed for" housing, state and local income and sales
taxes, etc., which can erode support for the tax base. This is important
in creating a shared support for the system and its underlying
premises.
For instance, renters commonly complain that they are unfairly
provided no "tax break" for their shelter expense, and those who take
the Standard Deduction routinely complain that they are denied a tax
reduction for their charitable contributions. Indeed, proponents of the
"flat tax" (which, at the individual level, would tax only labor earnings
above a Standard Deduction amount) routinely state that "no
deductions" for any outlays would be allowed. Of course the current
Standard Deduction and Personal and Dependent Exemption
Deductions combine to free from taxation an amount that presumably
represents an arbitrary fixed amount for shelter for the renter,
charitable contributions for the non-Itemizer, etc., and the same could
be said of the Standard Deduction that would accompany a "flat tax"
of the Hall/Rabushka type."' These allowances are, however,
"hidden" in a bland "Standard Deduction" or "Personal and
Dependent Exemption Deduction," which to the typical taxpayer
means nothing. It is easy to fall into the trap of thinking that "no tax
allowance" is recognized for a particular outlay unless it is specifically
identified: "the home mortgage interest" deduction, the deduction for
"state and local taxes," the "charitable contribution" deduction.
Those that take the Standard Deduction come to think that none of
their costs are being recognized by the tax system as ones that should
legitimately reduce the tax base. Creating a Nondiscretionary
Deduction for each taxpayer that explicitly allows the taxpayer to
deduct from the tax base specified percentages of the median outlays
for shelter, food, state and local income and sales taxes, etc. - each
explicitly identified as such and explicitly modified to take into
account the number of dependents in the household - would
reinforce the point that the tax system takes into account the
taxpayer's real cost of living. It would also concomitantly reinforce
the notion that amounts spent above the median are on "the
153 See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX vii (2d ed. 1995).
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taxpayer's dime" and not "the government's dime."
Second, the current Standard Deduction, Personal and
Dependent Exemption Deductions, and Child Tax Credit are
composed of arbitrarily selected amounts that do not pretend to have
any connection to empirical data. In contrast, the Nondiscretionary
Deduction would reflect empirical data regarding the actual median
costs of the component items and would be updated every few years
to reflect changes in the data. Thus, the tax system would address the
concern voiced by Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi that
the tax system should explicitly take account of the changing amounts
of "discretionary" income available to households over time.
Third, adoption of the Nondiscretionary Deduction would allow
the simplification of eliminating the distinction between "Above-the-
Line Deductions" and "Itemized Deductions" (and the concomitant
concept of "Adjusted Gross Income"). With the adoption of the
Nondiscretionary Deduction to take the place of several Itemized
Deductions, the Standard Deduction, the Personal and Dependent
Exemption Deductions, and the Child Tax Credit, there would no
longer be any need to differentiate among the different kinds of
deductions. The taxpayer would simply take his or her
Nondiscretionary Deduction and any other deduction (such as the
alimony deduction, the charitable contribution deduction, or income-
producing deductions) to which the taxpayer may be entitled.
Under current law, all taxpayers are permitted to take the so-
called Above-the-Line Deductions listed in section 61 directly from
Gross Income, without limit, which produces Adjusted Gross Income.
In addition, the taxpayer is entitled to take the Personal and
Dependent Exemption Deductions, as well as either the Standard
Deduction or the total of the taxpayer's Itemized Deductions,
including the home mortgage interest deduction, the deduction for
state and local taxes, and the charitable contribution deduction.
Several of these Itemized Deductions are subject to further limit
under sections 67 and 68. The latter, which is currently scheduled to
expire in 2010 (though it will be revived without further congressional
action in 2011), limits the amount of aggregate Itemized Deductions
(other than the medical expense deduction, the deduction for
investment interest, and the deduction for certain casualty, theft, or
gambling losses) that can be deducted by high-income taxpayers.
Section 68 was never really anything more than a backdoor marginal
rate increase for high-income taxpayers, which should be more
forthrightly done (if it is to be done at all) directly in the section 1 rate
schedules. Section 67 provides that all Itemized Deductions not listed
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in section 67(b) are deductible only to the extent that their aggregate
exceeds 2% of the taxpayer's Adjusted Gross Income (the amount of
Gross Income less the taxpayer's Above-the-Line Deductions). The
primary deductions that are subject to the so-called 2% floor are most
unreimbursed employee business expenses under section 162,
expenses and depreciation under sections 212(1), (2) and 168 (and
related sections) attributable to investment property other than those
producing rents and royalties, the costs of tax-preparation fees and
related expenses in section 212(3), and the so-called Hobby Loss
Deduction in section 183(b). If Congress wished to continue this limit,
it could easily do so by enacting a specific provision that lists these
particular deductions and provides that they are deductible only to the
extent that they, in the aggregate, exceed a specified percentage of
Gross Income (or Gross Income less the taxpayer's Nondiscretionary
Deduction) .154
The final recommendation in this section is not necessarily linked
to the Nondiscretionary Deduction, but this is as good a place as any
• 151
to say it: the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) should be repealed.
With the recasting of the tax base described in this article (and the
adjustment to the tax rate schedules that the new base would allow), it
would be an ideal time to take care of the AMT ticking time bomb .
To the extent that the adjustments and preferences listed in sections
56 and 57 are considered important to the definition of the tax base
(e.g., taxing the interest from private activity bonds not funding
essential governmental services, reducing the rate of accelerated
15 Similarly, the medical expense deduction in section 213 adopts a 7.5%-of-AGI
floor, and the personal casualty and theft deduction in section 165(h)(2)(A) adopts a
10%-of-AGI floor. Each could adopt a floor using Gross Income (or Gross Income
less the taxpayer's Nondiscretionary Deduction).
155 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., 2 STUDY OF THE
OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1986, JCS-3-01, at 2-22 (2001) (recommending repeal).
156 It has been estimated that, by 2010, 92% of taxpayers earning between
$100,000 and $500,000 will be subject to the AMT, 73% of households with income
between $75,000 and $100,000 will owe AMT, and households with income of less
than $100,000 will account for 52% of AMT taxpayers in. See Leonard E. Burman,
William G. Gale & Jeffrey Rohaly, The AMT: Projections and Problems, 100 TAX
NOTES 105 (2003). Enacted in 1969 when Congress learned that 155 millionaires had
avoided paying any income tax the prior year, the AMT, which essentially requires
taxpayers to compute tax under the regular income tax and the AMT and pay
whichever is higher, has become an administrative nightmare and has deviated far
from its original goals by reaching the middle class.
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depreciation of certain property, etc.), the changes should be made
directly to the relevant sections for all taxpayers.
V. THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL INCOME
A bedrock notion implicit in the idea that the tax base should aim
at shielding nondiscretionary income from tax while taxing
discretionary income under a progressive rate structure is that capital
income and labor income should be treated the same. To the extent
that labor or capital income falls within the Nondiscretionary
Deduction amount, it should escape taxation. To the extent that it
exceeds the Nondiscretionary Deduction and other deductions, it
should be subject to a progressive rate structure because, while
nondiscretionary costs increase as income rises, nondiscretionary costs
do not likely rise as fast as income rises."'
Suppose, for example, that the Nondiscretionary Deduction for
taxpayers A, B, and C, who have the same relevant status
characteristics that determine the amount of their Nondiscretionary
Deduction, is $20,000. A earns $40,000 in salary and realizes $10,000
of capital returns outside of qualified retirement accounts, composed
of any combination of interest, dividends, and capital gains; B earns
$50,000 in salary and realizes no capital returns outside of qualified
retirement accounts; and C earns no salary but realizes $50,000 of
capital returns outside of qualified retirement accounts. These three
taxpayers have the same $30,000 taxpaying capacity after taking into
account the Nondiscretionary Deduction. The first $20,000 of their
aggregate income should be protected from taxation as
"nondiscretionary" income, regardless of source, but the remaining
$30,000 should be subject to tax, at whatever graduated rate structure
the political process deems appropriate to raise the desired revenue.
The source of the income simply has no bearing on properly
measuring the taxpayers' "discretionary income." Reduced taxation
on capital income can result in taxpayers with equal amounts of
discretionary income, such as taxpayers A, B, and C, being taxed quite
differently, which violates fundamental notions of horizontal equity.
Since World War II, an increasing portion of the aggregate
federal tax revenue has been collected from labor income, as opposed
157 See supra Part III.
158 Horizontal equity is achieved when similarly situated taxpayers are taxed
alike. Likeness is usually measured by reference to the chosen tax base. If the chosen
tax base is "discretionary income," then taxpayers with the same amount of
"discretionary income" should pay the same amount of tax.
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to capital income. The chart below shows the aggregate tax collected
from each source at the federal level over the years."'
Total Tax Receipts, 1929-2002
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The amount of tax collected under the individual income tax (the
bottom slice) has remained fairly constant as a percentage of GDP
since WWII (when the income tax first became a "mass tax" instead
of a "class tax"). But notice the slice just above that. The payroll
taxes - composed chiefly of Social Security and Medicare taxes -
have increased substantially since WWII and now collect almost as
much revenue as the individual income tax. This tax is a tax on labor
income only (no capital income is taxed), the first dollar earned is
taxed with no exemptions, and as of 2006, only the first $94,000 is
• . . 160
taxed under the Social Security tax. The result is that this portion of
the aggregate federal tax burden is borne mostly by lower and middle
class wage earners. Notice the next slice on top of that - the
corporate tax. While we are uncertain who bears the economic
burden of the corporate tax, most economists tend to think that it is
borne by all holders of capital, not labor income. Furthermore,
notice the decreasing amounts collected under this tax since WWII.
Taken together, it shows that the aggregate federal tax burden, when
all federal taxes are considered, has shifted to labor income
159 This chart appears in Adam Carasso & C. Eugene Steuerle, Changes in Total
Government Tax Receipts Since 1929, 100 TAx NOTES 953 (2003).
160 The income ceiling for application of Social Security taxes increases as
average wage rates increase. The Medicare tax is applied to all wages without a
ceiling. See Geier, supra note 150, at 16-18.
161 See, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKIJA, 3d ed., supra note 69, at 76-79.
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significantly. Indeed, the payroll tax tranche and the corporate tax
tranche, summed together, take a fairly constant percentage of GDP
since WWII, but the mix between them shifts ever more of the burden
away from the corporate tax to the payroll tax.
Moreover, this trend has accelerated in recent years, as evidenced
most notably by the reduction in the most common capital gains rate
from 28% to 20% in 1997, followed by another 25% reduction (from
20% to 15%) and the extension of the capital gains rates to most
162dividend income in 2003, the repeal (at least for now) of the estate
tax in 2010, and temporary "expensing" provisions enacted in 2002.
Consumption tax advocates are not shy in stating their desires to free
capital returns entirely from taxation, effectively taxing only labor
income.
The result of the shift in tax burden away from capital income to
labor income is that the "super wealthy" can have an overall effective
federal tax rate that is lower than those who are "merely wealthy"
because capital income is heavily concentrated in the very wealthiest
of households. This is particularly true with respect to capital gains,
which are extremely concentrated in the wealthiest of households. As
162 Full and effective integration would be economically efficient, and nothing in
this article should be interpreted as a lack of support for integration. But this tax rate
reduction for dividend income was substituted for a provision that would have fully
integrated the corporate and individual taxes by allowing (1) dividends to be excluded
to the extent paid out of income that was fully taxed at the corporate level and (2) a
stock basis increase (thus reducing capital gain) to the extent of fully taxed retained
earnings. A reduced tax rate for all dividends (and a reduced tax rate for all capital
gain, whether realized on corporate stock, real estate, collectibles, etc.) "is a poor
substitute for a corporate tax integration plan." SLEMROD & BAKIJA, 3d ed., supra
note 69, at 276. While a full discussion of the various corporate tax integration plans is
beyond the scope of this article, it's worthwhile to note that the integration form most
consistent with a tax on discretionary income at the individual level might be a form
of mark-to-market system for publicly traded equity interests in business
organizations (such as stock, partnership interests, and interests in limited liability
companies) and a pass-through system for all privately held businesses, in whatever
organizational form held. Cf Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and
Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265
(1995). Indeed, the tax revenue lost under integration might well be offset by
matching the tax rate on capital gain and dividend income with that imposed on labor
income. The troublesome distributional effects of most stand-alone integration plans,
see SLEMROD & BAKIJA, 3d ed., supra note 69, at 277, would also be offset by such an
equalization of tax rates, as the same members of the wealthy elite would likely both
enjoy the benefits of integration and suffer the tax-rate increase on capital income.
Cf Leonard E. Burman, Taxing Capital Income Once, 98 TAx NoTEs 751 (2003).
Therefore, I think the best political strategy would be to present corporate tax
integration as part of the reform package suggested in this article.
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reported by Leonard Burman and Deborah Kobes, for example:
Capital gains become more significant at higher incomes, but
even at adjusted gross income (AGI) of $200,000 to $500,000,
they only averaged about 12 percent of income in 2000.
At very high incomes, however, capital gains dominate.
Those with incomes of $10 million or more report capital
gains equal to 57 percent of total income. For the 400
taxpayers with the highest incomes (AGI exceeding $86.8
million), capital gains make up more than 71 percent of
163income, while wages comprise less than 17 percent.
The chart below indicates dramatically how labor income decreases
164significantly and capital gains increase significantly as income rises.
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So1' table 400, IRS, Stetite ofhacere Bulot, Indlsidual Income Tax Returns 20, Pub ctton 131(16ev. 0402003., -lble 1, IRS, Scatis If o lecoe thifietie Spong 2{13, Pu*blication 1136 Rev aed 6-03),
163 Leonard E. Burman & Deborah I. Kobes, Composition of Income Reported
on Tax Returns, 101 TAX NOTES 783 (2003). While they noted that the stock market
bubble might have distorted these numbers somewhat, they stressed that earlier data
covering 10-year panels shows a similar pattern.
164 ,
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Here is another view, also including dividend income, showed
graphically.
The Wealth Effect
As taxpayers' incomes rise, so does the percentage of their income
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The result, as illustrated in the graph below for the year 2000, is
that those at the very top of the income spectrum can have lower
average tax rates than the merely wealthy.' 6'
Figure 1: Progressive to a Point?
The Distribution of the U.S. Federal Income Tax In 2000
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165 This chart appears in Edmund L. Andrews, A Clash of Goals in Bush's Efforts
on the Income Tax: Proposals Would Shift Burden from Wealthy to Middle Class, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2004, at C1.
'66 This chart appears in Martin A. Sullivan, The Rich Get Soaked While the
Super Rich Slide, 101 TAx NOTES 581, 582 (2003).
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While the above is a snapshot picture of 2000, when the stock
market bubble might have distorted the amount of realized capital
gain to a significant extent, the data for the top 400 taxpayers (by
AGI) appear to show broad consistency in the amount of capital gains
realized as a percentage of overall income. For example, the Service
published data on the top 400 from 1992 to 2000.167 In 1990 constant
dollars, the Adjusted Gross Income threshold for membership in this
elite group was $22,760,000 in 1992; $31,503,000 in 1996; and
$65,880,000 in 2000. The percentages of AGI consisting of wages and
net capital gain, respectively, as well as their "average tax rate" (total
tax paid divided by AGI) were as follows:'68
Salaries and Wages Net Capital Gain
Percent of AGI Percent of AGI Average Tax Rate
1992 26.22 36.08 26.38
1993 16.59 48.01 29.35
1994 10.15 52.26 28.57
1995 14.11 44.10 29.93
1996 11.14 63.40 27.81
1997 11.76 66.76 24.16
1998 12.54 72.91 22.02
1999 14.66 72.97 22.23
2000 16.70 71.83 22.29
Notice that the average tax rate dropped significantly beginning in
1997, even before the stock market bubble buildup. This reflected the
reduction in the capital gains tax rate from 28% to 20% in 1997.
These statistics obviously do not reflect the 2003 Act's further
reduction in the most common capital gains rate from 20% to 15%,
which presumably would have substantially reduced the average tax
169rates noted above if this rate had been in effect during these years.
167 STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, I.R.S., THE 400 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RETURNS REPORTING THE HIGHEST ADJUSTED GROSS INCOMES EACH YEAR, 1992-
2000, at 8 (Spring 2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/00in400h.pdf.
168 Id. at 8-9.
169 One might argue, as Joel Slemrod has, that the lower progressivity at the very
top may reflect merely a one-time bunched capital gain realization on, say, the sale of
a business. See Sullivan, supra note 166, at 581-82. But Martin Sullivan argues that
further examination, also taking into account unrealized (and untaxed) appreciation
in the assets owned by the wealthiest taxpayers, reduces this concern. See id. at 582-
83. Moreover, more recent work by Slemrod and his colleague Jon Bakija note that
income mobility appears to be decreasing or at least leveling off, concluding: "Since
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Recent evidence for 2003, however, shows the dramatic tax reduction
on investment income stemming from the 2003 Act's rate reductions
on dividends and capital gains. Taxpayers with income of greater than
$10 million saw the tax imposed on their dividends and capital gains
decrease by an average of $500,000.170
Taking the issue one step further, Peter Orszag has estimated the
direct effect of completely exempting capital gains, dividends, and
interest from taxation. He found:
The results highlight two key findings. First, the tax cut for
most tax units is modest. Only 41 percent of tax units would
experience a tax cut. Even in the middle 20 percent of the
income distribution, the average tax cut is only $70 in 2004.
Second, high-income households would receive a substantial
tax cut. The highest-income 1 percent would receive an
average cut of more than $50,000 in 2004. The top one
taxpayer in 1,000 taxpayers would receive more than 30
percent of the total tax cut, averaging almost $300,000 in
2004.171
Some might argue, however, that the very wealthy still pay a large
percentage of the overall tax burden, which ought to be enough to
satisfy fairness concerns. For example, data from the Congressional
Budget Office shows that the top 1% of income earners paid 36.5% of
all federal income taxes in 2000 (although, because it paid only 4.3%
of the payroll taxes, the top 1% paid only 25.6% of all federal
taxes). 72  But many believe that the amount of tax paid by each
income segment is misleading in evaluating the fair distribution of the
tax burden. Rather, they argue that trends in pre tax and after-tax
income are much more provocative in evaluating the distribution of
the degree of income mobility did not increase from one decade to the next, if
,snapshot' income inequality was increasing over this period, then so too was lifetime
inequality." SLEMROD & BAKIJA, 3d ed., supra note 69, at 67.
170 See David Cay Johnston, Big Gain for Rich Seen in Tax Cuts for Investments,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2006, at Al.
171 Peter R. Orszag, Exempting Dividends, Interest, and Capital Gains from
Taxation, 105 TAX NOTES 1435, 1435 (2004).
17 See ROBERT GREENSTEIN & ISAAC SHAPIRO, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL'Y
PRIORITIES, THE NEW, DEFINITIVE CBO DATA ON INCOME AND TAX TRENDS 10-11
(Sept. 23, 2003), http://www.cbpp.org/9-23-03tax.pdf (figures do not include estate and
gift taxes, customs duties, and other "miscellaneous sources").
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the tax burden. Since 1979, the income of the very rich has
skyrocketed, while the income of the middle and lower classes has
stagnated, and it is this trend that has resulted in the very wealthy
paying more tax.173
Between 1979 and 2000, the average after-tax income gain of
the top 1% was $576,400, while for the middle quintile it was
$5,500 and for the bottom quintile it was $1,100.... While
the average income of those in the 96th to 99th percentiles
was $158,600 in 2000 (your average successful doctor or
lawyer), the average income for those in the top 1% was
$862,700. In other words, income earners in the 96th to 99th
percentiles were much closer to the middle quintile earners
than they were to the top 1%, which is truly a class unto
itself.
7 4
In constant dollars, the income threshold for the top 0.1% rose to
$710,661 in 2002, from $321,679 in 1979.175
Ironically, the recent trend described above of shifting the tax
burden away from capital income to labor income is directly contrary
to the original purpose underlying the adoption of an income tax in
the early twentieth century.
Until the twentieth century (except for a brief period of
income taxation to fund the Civil War), the federal
government raised virtually all of its revenue through various
forms of consumption taxes, such as tariffs. Those who
debated whether or not to enact an income tax at the end of
the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth
century showed a sophisticated understanding of the
173 See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation,
45 B.C. L. REV. 993,994-95 (2004).
174 DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 143.
175 See MICHAEL STRUDLER, TOM PETSKA, & RYAN PETSKA, FURTHER ANALYSIS
OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND TAXES, 1979-2002, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/04asastr.pdf. Perhaps one factor contributing to this state of affairs is that the
increased national income arising from gains in U.S. productivity has increasingly
gone to capital rather than labor, and therefore to wealthy holders of capital. See
Louis Uchitelle, Were the Good Old Days That Good?, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, § 3,
at 1 (explaining that "[l]abor's share [of productivity gains], which has historically
represented 60 to 65 percent of the total, has fallen in the last five years to the low end
of that range" and citing economist Robert Gordon for the proposition that the share
taken by capital holders "has increasingly found its way to upper-income families as
stock options, dividends, special bonuses and the like").
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difference between consumption taxation and income
taxation and of the regressiveness of consumption taxes.
Supporters of income taxation argued that it would more
fairly apportion the tax burden by shifting it away from
176consumption to capital income.
The income tax that was enacted in 1913 was thus specifically
aimed at income from capital by establishing personal
exemption amounts that were high enough to free most labor
income earned by most workers from taxation. So, although
it was denominated a tax on "income," it's not too far-fetched
to say that it acted primarily as a tax on the capital income of
the wealthy. Even Treasury Secretary Andrew W. Mellon, no
knee-jerk liberal, argued in the 1920s that earned income
ought to be taxed more lightly than capital income.'77
The reason why the shift to taxing the capital income of the
wealthy was thought to be fair was, it can be argued, because that type
of income was considered "discretionary," whereas amounts spent on
basic consumption were considered "nondiscretionary." Though the
specific rubric "discretionary" and "nondiscretionary" was not used,
the distinction implicitly infuses the early debates about the fairness of
adopting an income tax in the first place. The implicit assumption
evident in the debates surrounding adoption of an income tax is that a
tax on capital income more fairly represents a tax on discretionary
income than does a tax on consumption. And a tax on consumption
can be economically equivalent to a tax on labor income only.79
For example,' 80 assume that Jane earns $100,000 of wages, that the
prevailing average investment return is 10%, that the tax rate is a flat
30%, and that Jane holds her investment for one year before
consuming 100% of everything (principal and investment return).
Under'a retail sales tax or a value added tax, Jane would not be taxed
176 Deborah A. Geier, Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform and the Top
1%, 56 SMU L. REV. 99, 100 (2003).
177 Id. at 102 (citing ANDREW W. MELLON, TAXATION: THE PEOPLE'S BUSINESS
93-107 (1924)).
178 See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and
the Meaning of "Incomes," 33 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1057 (2001) (collecting numerous
quotations of the day).
179 See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 68-73.
180 These examples are drawn from id. at 72-73.
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on her wages. She would thus have $100,000 to invest, which would
earn a 10% return of $10,000 under our assumptions. When she
spends the $110,000 at the end of the year, she would pay a tax of
$33,000 (30% of her consumption). Her net return would thus be
$77,000 ($110,000 less $33,000).
We could create the same net return for Jane if we simply taxed
Jane's wages but exempted her investment return from tax. In that
case, Jane would pay a $30,000 tax on her $100,000 of wages, leaving
her $70,000 to invest. Her 10% return of $7,000 would be free from
tax, producing a net return of $77,000 - the same as under the retail
sales tax above.
Finally, we could also create the same net return under a "cash-
flow consumption tax," under which all cash flows, including
borrowed money, are included in the tax base, and all non-
consumption outlays, such as the purchase of an investment or the
repayment of borrowed funds, are deducted. Returning to Jane, for
example, her $100,000 in wages would be included, but her $100,000
investment would be deducted, producing no tax at this point and
leaving the full $100,000 to invest. The investment would earn a 10%
return of $10,000, and when the entire $110,000 (principal and
investment return) are consumed, Jane would pay tax of $33,000, once
again leaving a $77,000 net return ($110,000 less $33,000).
Each of these examples produces a different result than under a
pure income tax, where both wages and the return to capital are
taxed. As under the wage tax, Jane's $100,000 of wages would be
taxed initially, producing a $30,000 tax and leaving only $70,000 to
invest. Unlike under a wage tax, however, her $7,000 investment
return would also be taxed, producing another $2,100 in tax. Thus,
her net return under an income tax would be only $74,900.
Because of the concentration of capital income in the very
wealthiest of households, a tax on labor income only at the individual
level cannot realistically replicate the progressivity of the current tax
burden under the income tax. Households in the top 1% earn only
about 45% of their aggregate income from labor. 8 1 For those
households that adhere to this average, it might be theoretically
possible to maintain the same progessivity as today if we simply
translated the tax that would otherwise be imposed on capital income
(the $2,100 in the income tax example above) into higher marginal
rates on-the labor earnings of these high earners (a tax rate in excess
181 See Alan B. Krueger, When It Comes to Income Inequality, More Than Just
Market Forces Are at Work, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at C2.
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of 30% in the example above). But a return to pre-Reagan high
marginal rates is both not politically realistic in the 21s" century and
not good economic policy in the eyes of most economists. Moreover,
for those high-income households that earn very little labor income,
such as heirs living off of the return of inherited capital, it would be
absolutely impossible to replicate the current progressivity with a tax
solely on labor returns. In sum, a wage tax would further shift the tax
burden away from the top 1%, which controlled roughly 33% of the
182nation's private wealth in 2001, to the middle class.
There is another shortcoming to a wage tax, in particular. A wage
tax treats all investments the same on an ex ante basis. Thus, the same
$30,000 tax (in our wage tax example above) would be paid on Jane's
$100,000 of wages (leaving $70,000 to invest), even if she earns an
extraordinary return in excess of what most investors earn on a
$70,000 investment (which allows her to consume more, after all). If
the prevailing investment return for most investors is 10%, but Jane is
lucky enough to earn an extraordinary return of 30% on her
investment, she would still pay only the same $30,000 tax paid by all
others who invested $70,000 and earned only 10%. Jane would be
able to consume not merely $77,000, as would most investors, but
$91,000 ($70,000 plus $21,000 investment return). Most would argue
that this unequal treatment is unfair.
A cash-flow consumption tax, in contrast, treats all investments
the same on an ex post basis. That is to say, all investments with the
same gross return are treated the same because the tax event occurs at
the point of consumption. So if John invested only $60,000 and
earned a total return of $110,000 before consuming it, he would be
taxed the same as Jane, who invested $70,000 and earned a total
return of $110,000 before consuming it. But a cash-flow consumption
tax is simply impossible to implement as a political matter, as it would
require the inclusion of borrowed money in the tax base (with a
deduction of principal and interest repayments). The average citizen
simply will not tolerate the taxation of money borrowed to purchase a
home, to pay for higher education, or to make ends meet when
catastrophe strikes and the job is lost (even though a sales tax
effectively reaches such borrowing). The cash-flow consumption tax
is too close in form to the current tax structure, under which borrowed
money is not taxed, for the public to equate it with a sales tax rather
182 See Arthur B. Kennickell, A Rolling Tide: Changes in the Distribution of
Wealth in the U.S., 1989-2001, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/papers/
concentration.2001.6.pdf.
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than the current tax system - particularly when it is offered as a
replacement for the current system. As a replacement for the current
tax system, a tax that includes borrowed money in the tax base is not
politically salable to the public. In short, a cash-flow consu*lption tax
is dead on arrival as a realistic alternative, even if marginal rates could
be made so progressive at the top as to replicate the current
distribution of the tax burden (which is unlikely).183
The only remaining consumption tax alternatives are not annual
taxes but transaction-based taxes: sales taxes and value added taxes.
Neither can accommodate a progressive rate schedule and thus
neither can replicate the current progressivity of the income tax.
Some argue fairness norms must be trumped by economic norms
in some cases, and decreased taxation or complete exemption of
capital income (as compared to labor income), or substitution of a
flat-rate sales tax or value added tax for our current hybrid
income/consumption tax, is defended chiefly on economic growth
grounds today. As the eminent public finance economist Richard
Musgrave once wrote, however, "any departure from equity must
have clear justification in terms of probable effectiveness with regard
to growth,"'18 and the economic evidence regarding economic growth
is not particularly compelling.
As a matter of history, for example, the evidence appears to be
weak. Robert Frank, for example, notes that the "golden age" of high
productivity and growth rates in the United States and most of the
rest of the industrialized world occurred between the end of WWII
and roughly 1973. This era was a time of high marginal rates on the
wealthy, a time when a much larger percentage of the aggregate tax
burden was contributed by the corporate tax (a tax on capital owned
disproportionately by the wealthy), and a time of much less income
and wealth inequality than is seen today. Moreover, those countries
with greater shares of national income going to the poor and middle
classes had higher growth rates. 18 Freeing the capital income of the
183 Slemrod and Bakija conclude that a cash-flow consumption tax would simply
be too difficult to administer to be an effective replacement for current law.
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, 3d. ed., supra note 69, at 255-56.
184 Letter from Richard Musgrave to Walter Heller (Oct. 1960), in JOHN F.
WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 159 (1985).
Heller would later become head of President Kennedy's Council of Economic
Advisors.
185 See Robert H. Frank, Progressive Taxation and the Incentive Problem, in
DOES ATLAS SHRUG?: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 490, 494
(Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, 3d ed., supra note 69, at 114-18.
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wealthy from tax (or taxing it at lower rates than labor income),
thereby reducing the progressivity of the tax burden, could accomplish
little more than greater income and wealth inequality than we see
186 187today18 6  th little or no boost to economic growth.
The argument that reducing taxation of capital income or savings
results in increased economic growth assumes that decreased taxation
of savings or capital will cause changes in behavior that result in more
savings and capital for new investment in new ventures and
technologies, which will lead to an expanding economy. But there are
several problems with the assumptions in the argument. It assumes
that people would react to the tax incentive by actually substituting
consumption behavior with saving behavior (called the substitution
effect), thereby increasing the percentage of income saved. Those
people who save for fixed targets, however, such as $500,000 saved by
retirement age, or $50,000 saved by the time Junior reaches college,
could actually save a lower percentage of their income than they did
under an income tax that reached savings currently and still reach
their targeted savings numbers (called the income effect). The
empirical evidence is incomplete regarding the number of "target
.1 188
savers" out there, but it appears to be high. The evidence seems to
indicate that the vast middle class contains many so-called life-cycle
savers: target savers who attempt to save just enough to meet
contemplated future consumption needs.189 Indeed, the savings rate
186 See David Cay Johnston, More Get Rich and Pay Less in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2002, at A22 (citing NYU economics professor Edward N. Wolff's conclusion
that "wealth in America is more highly concentrated today than at any time since
1929."). See generally Geier, supra note 176, at 110-19 (documenting the trend
toward greater concentration of after-tax income and wealth in the top 1%).
187 See Hal R. Varian, Perhaps It's Time for a Thorough Tax Overhaul, But the
Question Is, What Should Any Reconfigured System Look Like?, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2005, at C2 ("Some economists have claimed that the changes in 1986 increased the
economy's growth rate by as much as 1 percent in the years immediately afterward.").
One of the most dramatic changes made in that act was the repeal of the reduced tax
rate on capital gain, taxing it at the same rate as the taxpayer's ordinary income. That
change meant that the highest capital gains tax rate was increased from 20% to 28%,
the highest ordinary income tax rate. Unfortunately, only five years later when the
top tax rate on ordinary income was raised to 31%, the top tax rate on capital gains
was left at 28%, reintroducing favoritism based on source of income.
188 "Economic theory is completely silent on the question of which of these two
opposing effects will dominate. The case for the conventional (supply side) position
must therefore be made on empirical grounds." Frank, supra note 185, at 491.
189 See Carroll, supra note 27, at 465-66. The super rich, on the other hand, have
very high savings rates - additional evidence that freeing all savings (or capital
returns) from current taxation would further reduce progressivity and increase after-
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(the percentage of income saved) has consistently fallen over the last
twenty years, the very time period during which tax subsidies for
savings, which were broadly introduced in the early 1980s, increased
substantially.'9 This correlation indirectly supports the notion that
there are a lot of target savers out there for whom reduced taxation of
savings results in a decreased percentage of income saved.
Moreover, the United States is not a closed economy; capital not
supplied by American savings has been readily supplied by foreigners.
In other words, there does not appear to be a capital crunch in the
United States that is slowing economic growth. If anything, there
appears to be more money sloshing around looking for good
investments than available investment opportunities'91 - a "global
saving glut," in the words of Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve.192 Many believe this excess capital
is contributing to the worldwide run-up in housing prices, for example,
as the capital looks for somewhere to go.193
Finally, tax incentives or disincentives may simply have very little
effect on savings behavior in any event.
Behavioral economists admit to not knowing at all why
people save. The decision can be an amalgam of inability to
delay gratification, hyperbolic discount rates (which is
another way of saying the same thing, because it means that a
person would require unreasonably high rates of return to
make it worthwhile to save and thus delay immediate
gratification), general personality traits, even the role of
shame. Since middle class savers already enjoy...
consumption tax treatment for the bulk of their savings,
enacting a pure consumption tax might do little more than
provide inefficient windfall benefits to the top 1% for the
savings behavior that they would have engaged in anyway.194
tax income and wealth inequality.
190 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, 3d ed., supra note 69, at 129-30.
191 See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Too Much Capital: Why It Is Getting Harder to Find a
Good Investment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,2005, at C1.
192 See, e.g., Jon E. Hilsenrath & Patrick Barta, Amid Low Rates, Home Prices
Rise Across the Global Village, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2005, at Al (also quoting
another commentator as saying, "[t]here is a tremendous amount of money floating
around looking to invest").
193 See id.
194 Geier, supra note 176, at 147.
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For example, recent work by behavioral economists show a
significant increase in savings in the lower and middle classes simply
by changing the default rules for enrolling in savings plans associated
with employment. While the typical employer requires the employee
to opt into these plans, those who automatically enroll employees and
require them to opt out if they do not wish to participate see
dramatically increased savings rates among employees. "In one
study..., shifting to automatic enrollment raised participation among
poorer workers from just over 10% to over 80%. " 195 As the
Economist Magazine suggests: "Rather than focusing on tax
incentives, recent economic research suggests politicians ought to look
harder at what stops people saving." '196
Joel Slemrod and Jon Bakija, after surveying the literature,
concluded that the economic benefits from consumption taxation (or
freeing capital income from tax) would not likely be great.
The weight of the evidence suggests private saving is probably
not very responsive to the after-tax rate of return. The
bottom line is that switching to a consumption tax does not
guarantee a big boost in saving and investment--our best
guess is that at most there would be only a small increase.
Because there are more direct ways to increase national
saving (for example, increasing the budget surplus), the likely
but not assured prospect of a somewhat higher saving rate
does not appear to be, by itself, a reason to undertake a
wholesale transformation of the tax system.197
Finally, much of the economic-growth punch, such as it is, that
could come from a switch to a clean consumption tax would likely
arise from the one-time wealth tax effectively imposed on
accumulated wealth at the time of the transition. For example, under
195 The Shift Away from Thrift, ECONOMIST, Apr. 9, 2005, at 60.
196 Id.
197 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, 2d ed., supra note 36, at 235. These conclusions continue
in the third edition of their book, where they say: "If empirical evidence showed a
strong positive relationship between saving and its after-tax rate of return, the
economic costs of our income tax and the economic benefits of switching to a
consumption tax could be quite large. However, the available evidence does not
readily reveal any such relationship." SLEMORD & BAKIJA, 3d ed., supra note 69, at
129; see also id. at 212-14 (notably updating the second edition language quoted
above that refers to "increasing the budget surplus" to "reducing the budget deficit")
and 265-71 (concluding that "switching to a consumption tax is unlikely to increase
permanently our rate of growth at all").
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a cash-flow consumption tax for businesses, depreciation deductions
relating to old wealth would simply disappear (only new investments
would be expensed). Moreover, consumption of previously saved
amounts by the elderly in retirement would trigger a second tax on old
wealth under a cash-flow consumption tax or sales tax that would not
be paid under current law. But CEOs of fortune 500 companies about
to lose billions in depreciation deductions and the elderly who
consume from previously taxed savings could be expected to argue
vociferously in the political arena for transition relief, thus negating
whatever meager boost to economic growth might otherwise arise
from the switch. 98
Three other commonly cited arguments for a reduced rate on
capital gains are the bunching problem, the inflation gain problem,
and the lock-in effect. With respect to the first, the argument is that,
because gain is realized entirely in one year, some of that gain might
be taxed at a higher marginal rate than might have occurred had the
gain been taxed as it accrued over time. But the deferral of gain
recognition under the realization principle can be more valuable
because of the time value of money than any detriment arising
because of bunching. This is particularly true if the taxpayer was in
the highest marginal rate bracket over the entire period of gain
accrual (and recall that capital gain is highly concentrated in the
wealthier households). Finally, the cure for this problem, if it is a
problem, would be income averaging, a provision that was repealed in
1986 with the general flattening of the rate structure. A uniform rate
reduction for all capital gain does not seem warranted on this ground.
With respect to inflation gain, any inflation adjustment needs to
affect not only gain on "capital" assets but recognized gain on all
assets as well as other tax attributes affected by inflation, such as
depreciation and net operating loss carryovers. Moreover, a fixed
lower rate for all capital gain as an inflation adjustor is extremely
crude, applicable whether the asset has been held a year and a day or
twenty years and regardless of the inflation rate over time. As I (and
my co-authors) explain elsewhere:
[T]here is a "correct" technical solution to the inflation
problem, which is to index the basis of all assets according to
a formula:
new basis = previous basis x price index at end of year
price index at beginning of year
198 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, 3d. ed., supra note 69, at 215.
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Although indexing the basis of property has intellectual
support in some academic, business, and investment circles,
there are practical and political obstacles. One is that it is
complex; not only assets but also depreciation deductions,
NOL carryovers, capital loss carryovers, etc. - anything that
affects how the tax base is measured over time - would have
to be indexed. Another is that, if the basis of assets were
indexed for inflation, then the basis (principal) of debt
instruments must also be indexed, since they are assets owned
by lenders. Borrowers enjoy a benefit in times of inflation,
because they are repaying debt with dollars that aren't worth
as much as when they borrowed them. When debt basis is
increased, a portion of what is nominally called "interest" on
the debt really becomes a return of "principal."
To illustrate, assume that Kunal borrows $1,000 for one year
at 10% interest on January 1 and that there is 5% inflation
during the year. At the end of the year, the $1,000 of principal
which the lender is entitled to receive back is worth only $950
($1,000 less [.05 x $1,000]). If the debt basis, or principal, is
increased to account for this inflation, then the $1,000 of
nominal principal and the $100 nominal interest ($1,100 total)
paid by Kunal at year end will be recharacterized for tax
purposes as $1,050 of principal ($1,000 x 1.05) and $50 of
interest ($1,100 total). Thus, indexing debt for inflation would
confer a tax advantage on banks (which would be entitled to
"exclude," as return of principal, what is called "interest" in
the loan documents). On the other hand, business and
investment debtors.., would be denied a deduction for the
portion of the nominal interest recharacterized as "principal."
Because the losers far outnumber the winners, indexing debt
is such a "hard sell" politically that no U.S. politician has even
tried.
Some have proposed indexing the basis of all assets except
debt principal. This would, however, distort investment
decisions by allowing well-informed taxpayers to engage in
tax arbitrage. For example, assume that Kunal, whose
marginal income is taxed in the 35% bracket, borrows $1,000
at 10% interest and purchases a non-depreciable investment
asset for $1,000. A year later, he sells the asset for $1,100 and
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uses the sales proceeds to pay the $1,000 of principal and $100
of interest owed on the loan. Kunal hasn't realized a dime of
economic profit from his debt-financed investment, and his
tax results reflect this: he incurs $35 of tax on this $100 gain
and saves $35 of tax from his $100 interest deduction, thus
leaving him with zero tax liability. Now, however, assume
that there was 5% inflation during the year and that asset
basis, but not interest or debt basis, is indexed. Kunal's asset
basis would be adjusted to $1,050 ($1,000 cost x 1.05), his sale
gain would be only $50 ($1,100 AR less $1,050 AB), and the
tax on this gain would be $17.50 ($50 x .35). But Kunal would
also deduct a $100 (unindexed) interest payment, resulting in
$35 of tax savings, so that he would have $17.50 of tax savings
in excess of his tax liability ($35 tax saved less $17.50 tax
owed). In other words, with indexing that did not affect debt
basis or interest, Kunal would come out $17.50 ahead after
tax even though his debt-financed investment produced an
economic wash. More broadly, indexing limited in this way
would encourage taxpayers to make debt-financed
investments that are economically pointless, or sub-marginal,
in order to produce tax arbitrage gains like Kunal's, i.e., it
would be an economically inefficient change in the law.
Because of these problems and because much, if not most,
long-term capital gain property is acquired by borrowing, the
best practical solution to the inflation problem may be to
refrain from indexing. The overstatement of gain on sales of
investment assets would then be offset (perhaps more than
offset) by the investor's deduction of overstated interest and
the advantage of deferring tax on the investment gain until
sale.' 99
Recall that I recommended earlier that the gain recognized on the
sale of the primary personal residence be reduced for inflation gain so
that only the gain in excess of inflation gain is taxed (to the extent not
protected by the Nondiscretionary Deduction). Because I
concurrently recommended that interest paid on home mortgage debt
no longer be deducted as such (to be replaced for homeowners with a
shelter component in their Nondiscretionary Deduction computed by
reference to the median rental cost of single-family homes for various
199 DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 737-38.
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household sizes, median property taxes, and median utility costs),
there would be no tax arbitrage problem in that context. Moreover,
since inflation adjustments would be limited to that single context, it
would not be administratively difficult to implement (a table on the
home sale gain form would easily take care of the issue) and yet would
also comply with President Bush's mandate that the ownership of
homes continue to be favored over the ownership of other, competing
assets.
A final argument often made in defense of a lower tax rate on
capital gains is the so-called lock-in effect: that the tax on sale of
capital assets artificially inhibits the efficient allocation of investment
capital across the economy. I and my co-authors respond to that
argument elsewhere as follows:
The lock-in (or economic efficiency) argument would be
persuasive only to the extent that it could be shown that
particular property could be put to more productive use if
owned by a taxpayer different from the current owner, and
the current owner does not sell to the more efficient user
solely because of the tax that would be due on sale. This
argument is not persuasive with respect to most Capital
Assets, such as stocks, bonds, and collectibles. It might have
some force with respect to real estate because of the unique
nature of each parcel, where some taxpayers may be in a
better position than others to develop the property. But... a
large swath of business and investment real estate is
exchanged in kind to take advantage of deferral under § 1031.
Moreover, a more significant cause of the lock-in effect for
any remaining gain is § 1014, which permanently exempts
unrealized gains on property owned at death and thereby
encourages taxpayers to hold appreciated property until their
demise in order to transfer it to their heirs with the gain
laundered out.
The second problem with the "capital mobility" argument is
that it suggests that any tax benefit on liquidating investments
should be conditioned on reinvesting the proceeds from the
sale of the investment. The capital-mobility rationale is
entirely lost with respect to capital gain realized in order to
finance consumption. There is currently no reinvestment
[Vol. 25:765
HeinOnline  -- 25 Va. Tax Rev. 828 2005-2006
2006] The Taxation of Income 829
requirement, however .... 200
In sum, the arguments for moving away from the original purpose
for enacting an income tax - to tax capital income and not merely
consumption - are not persuasive. They are clearly inconsistent with
the premises described in this article that the "ideal" tax base should
focus not on the source of income, whether from labor or capital, but
rather on whether the income can fairly be considered to be
"discretionary" or "nondiscretionary."
VI. GRATUITOUS RECEIPTS
The Civil War income tax treated gratuitous receipts as "income."
But neither the 1894 income tax that was held unconstitutional in
Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.20 nor the first income tax
enacted in 1913 after ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment taxed
gratuitous receipts as "income. ' '202 There is no legislative history
informing us of the reasoning behind the change in heart between the
mid-19'h century tax and the later taxes, but "enough is known to
permit some informed speculation.,
203
By the turn of the twentieth century, both the law of trust
accounting and business or financial accounting had
developed notions of what constitutes "income" for their
separate purposes, and these notions may have informed
early thinking about what the term "income" should mean
within the context of a tax on "income." By the time of
Henry Simons's path-breaking work in 1938 describing the
contours of the term "income" for tax purposes, under which
gratuitous receipts could be considered "income" to the
donee, the estate and gift taxes were in place and perhaps
provided an independent reason for excluding gratuitous
receipts under the income tax.2°4
It has never been generally held that a dollar taxed to another
somewhere in the economy cannot be taxed when transferred again to
a different taxpayer. When I earn wages (includable in my gross
200 Id. at 739-40.
201 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
202 Indeed, current law still allows exclusion from gross income of all receipts
acquired "by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." I.R.C. § 102(a).
203 DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 155.
204 Id. at 155-57.
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income under sections 61(a)(1)) and then take some of my after-tax
dollars and pay my window washer for washing my windows (a
nondeductible personal expense to me), my window washer cannot
successfully argue that his receipt should not be taxed because the
dollars were once previously taxed to me. And this should remain
true even in the case of a mere transfer, without my windows being
washed. That is to say, ever since Henry Simons's refinement of what
the term "income" ought to mean for tax purposes, each taxpayer is
generally viewed independently, where the same dollar can result in
multiple wealth accessions (and thus "income") as after-tax amounts
are transferred from taxpayer to taxpayer. After Simons, the relevant
question generally is: To what extent has the taxpayer been enriched?
Nevertheless, as noted above, the unlimited gift exclusion has
continued, most likely because of the concomitant existence of the
wealth transfer taxes. Under current law, however, the estate and
generation-skipping taxes are scheduled to be fully repealed in 2010,
only to be resurrected in full force in 2011 without further action on
the part of Congress. Even with the temporary repeal of these taxes
in 2011, however, the gift tax was continued for two reasons. First,
retention of the gift tax ensured that the temporary, one-year repeal
of the estate tax did not result in effective repeal for an entire
205generation. Second, even with permanent repeal of the estate and
generation-skipping taxes, retention of the gift tax would ensure that
investment property is not shifted without tax cost among family
members in order to have the subsequent investment income taxed at
the lowest family member rate while effectively keeping it "all in the
family." In other words, the gift tax would act as a backup to protect
the integrity of the progressive rate structure of the income tax, as do
both section 1(g) (the so-called kiddie tax) and the common-law,
206
assignment-of-income doctrine.
President Bush's current proposal to make permanent the repeal
of the estate and generation-skipping taxes would continue the gift tax
205 See John Buckley, Estate Tax Repeal: More Losers Than Winners, 106 TAX
NOTES 833, 833 (2005) (noting that, in the absence of a gift tax, "even a very short
period during which [gift tax] repeal was in effect would effectively repeal the estate
tax for a generation. Individuals could simply gift the bulk of their assets to their
children during the period of repeal. Retention of the gift tax effectively forecloses
that opportunity.").
206 See Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Mitchell M. Gans, Wealth Transfer Tax Repeal:
Some Thoughts on Policy and Planning, 90 TAX NOTES 393 (2001) (alerting Congress
to the need to retain the gift tax as a backup to the income tax, even with permanent
repeal of the estate tax).
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207for lifetime gifts in excess of $1 million. Current section 1014,
allowing a fair market value basis for all property transferred at death,
would be replaced by proposed section 1022, which would require a
carryover basis, with two adjustments. First, the basis of any
appreciated property could be increased by up to $1.3 million
(indexed for inflation) "for free," not to exceed the property's fair
market value. Second, property transferred to a surviving spouse
could be increased "for free" by up to an additional $3 million
(indexed for inflation), not to exceed the property's fair market value.
The fairness value espoused in this article - that income
available for discretionary use ought to be taxed - means that
gratuitous receipts should be included in the gross income of the
recipient to the extent exceeding an administratively feasible de
minimis floor of, say, $25,000 per year.208 Transfers to spouses would
continue to be excluded in full, as they are under current section
1041(b)(1). To the extent that an includable receipt is offset by the
taxpayer's Nondiscretionary Deduction, it will be protected from
taxation, but to the extent that the includable receipt exceeds the
taxpayer's Nondiscretionary Deduction (and other deductions), it
ought to be taxed. There is no persuasive reason why the $150,000 in
wages of a hardworking taxpayer ought to be taxed to the extent
exceeding the Nondiscretionary Deduction and other allowable
deductions, while the taxpayer who receives "gifts" of $150,000 has no
tax liability.
If section 102 were amended in this fashion, the estate, gift, and
generation-skipping transfer taxes could each be permanently
repealed. Whether the transfer is received during the donor's life or
at his or her death, the recipient of an in-kind gift could take a fair
market value basis, as under current section 1014 only for transfers at
death, to the extent that the property is included in gross income. The
carryover basis rule in section 1015 currently applicable to all inter
vivos gifts would apply only to those in-kind gifts (whether at death or
during life) excluded under the de minimis rule.9 The well-
207 See, e.g., Karen C. Burke, Estate Tax Repeal and the Budget Process, 104 TAX
NOTES 1049 (2004) (confirming details of the proposal but questioning its viability).
208 As an outlay not in pursuit of income production, the transfer would be
nondeductible to the transferor.
209 For example, assume that the only gift received by the recipient in a tax year
is a gift of property in kind with a fair market value of $25,000 and a basis in the hands
of the donor of $10,000. Since the gift would be excludable under the de minimis rule,
the recipient would take a $10,000 carryover basis in the property. If, on the other
hand, the recipient receives property with a fair market value of $1 million and a basis
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 25 Va. Tax Rev. 831 2005-2006
Virginia Tax Review
documented difficulties of the proposed carryover basis rule in section
1022 could thus be avoided. In addition, Congress could continue
favored treatment for certain assets under an income-inclusion
system, such as the transfer of a working farm to family members, if
desired. Moreover, if the underlying value of the current estate tax is
to discourage undue concentrations of wealth (and thus power), an
income-inclusiop system would encourage breaking up a large estate
among as large a number of beneficiaries as possible (to take
advantage of the multiple Nondiscretionary Deductions of the
recipients) more effectively than would a single estate tax imposed on
the donor. Finally, the incentive for transfers to charities would be
continued because receipts by qualified tax-exempt organizations
would be excluded by the organization and deducted by the donor to
the extent allowed under section 170.
At least two potential difficulties would need to be addressed, but
neither appears insurmountable. Support received by a minor child is
not currently includable in gross income.2!° Since these amounts are
presumably "nondiscretionary," this current treatment is consistent
with the values underlying this article. But since both "support"
characterization and "gift" characterization results in "no inclusion"
under current law, repeal of the unlimited gift exclusion would
require, for the first time, differentiating excludable "support" from
potentially includable "gifts." Treasury would need to draft
regulations under section 102 drawing the line between the two, but
the line should not be terribly difficult to draw in most instances.
Excludable "support" should include all in-kind transfers of such
consumption items and services as food, clothing, housing, medical
care, entertainment, and education of the minor child. Similar
provision by a parent to a dependent child enrolled in full-time higher
education would also be defensible. Transfers of cash and investment
property, on the other hand, should not qualify as "support."
in the hands of the donor of $250,000, the recipient would include the full $1 million
value (since it exceeds the de minimis amount) and would take a basis of $1 million in
the property. In neither case would the transfer be considered a realization event for
the donor with respect to any built-in gain or loss.
210 See, e.g., Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917). Though Gould held that a
divorcee's receipt of support from her ex-husband was not "income," the Court's
rationale would equally apply to transfers to minor children. (Transfers between
divorcing spouses are now governed by sections 71 and 1041.) See generally DODGE
ET AL, supra note 4, at 188-91 (discussing the common-law "support" exclusion).
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As identified by a recent report by a Task Force appointed by the
.- 211
American Bar Association Tax Section, another difficulty that
212
would need to be addressed is the transfer to a trust. Under current
law, a transfer of cash or property to a trust is treated as an excludable
"gift," and the trust corpus is also excludable when received by the
ultimate beneficiary. Subchapter J of the Code prescribes the rules
pertaining to the taxation of income earned by the trust on its assets.
Very generally speaking, retained trust income is taxed to the trust
itself under section 1(e), while previously untaxed distributed trust
income is taxed to the beneficiary.
With repeal of the unlimited gift exclusion for direct transfers to
individuals, a decision would have to be made regarding whether
similar transfers to trusts ought to be immediately includable by the
trust. If it were not - if, instead, the taxation of the corpus is delayed
until received by the ultimate beneficiary - there would be a tax
incentive (deferral) to make transfers via trusts rather than directly. If
the problem with taxing the trust in the year of trust receipt is lack of
liquidity, perhaps deferral could be granted but only at the cost of an
interest charge to take account of the time value of deferral."
VII. CONCLUSION
The distinction that I draw between discretionary and
nondiscretionary income has resonance not only in rationalizing
current law but for reforming and simplifying it. Our current system
evidences a consensus that not all consumption ought to be taxed (as
211 See TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXES, A.B.A., REPORT
ON REFORM OF FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXES, reprinted in 58 TAX LAW. 93
(2004) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. In Appendix A, the Task Force examined and
reported on three possible modes of wealth transfer taxation: (1) an estate, gift, and
generation-skipping transfer tax imposed on the donor, (2) a lifetime accretions tax,
separate from the income tax, imposed on donees, and (3) an income inclusion for the
donee under the existing income tax. Id. at 279. Consistent with the third option, the
unlimited exclusion for life insurance proceeds received on account of the death of
the insured under section 101(a)(1) should also be repealed.
On the option of including gratuitous receipts, see also Joseph M. Dodge,
Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of
Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1992).
212 See TASK FORCE, supra note 211, at 293-94.
211 Cf. I.R.C. § 1291 (imposing a similar interest charge on Passive Foreign
Investment Company (PFIC) income to the extent immediate inclusion on the PFIC
owner's tax return is deferred until actual distribution of PFIC earnings or sale of the
PFIC stock).
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it would under a pure consumption tax), that not all savings of the
middle class for retirement and other specified needs should be
currently taxed (as they would under a pure income tax), and that not
all savings of the very wealthy should avoid current taxation (as they
would under a pure consumption tax). The lines that demarcate our
current hybrid income/consumption tax recognize that the issue is not
so much whether the outlay at issue qualifies as "consumption" or
"savings" but rather whether the particular consumption or savings at
issue can fairly be considered "nondiscretionary," in which case it
would not fairly be available to the fisc, or "discretionary," and thus
fair game.
This insight points to three significant reforms: (1) creating a
single Nondiscretionary Deduction (with component parts based on
median outlays for various nondiscretionary costs for households of
various sizes) that would replace the Standard Deduction, the
Personal and Dependent Exemption Deductions, the Child Tax
Credit, the Qualified Residence Interest Deduction, the Deduction
for State and Local Income and Property Taxes, and perhaps the
Dependent Care Credit and the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits,
(2) taxing labor and capital income at the same (progressive) rates,
and (3) repealing the unlimited gift exclusion (with concomitant
repeal of the estate, gift, and generation-skipping taxes). These
reforms would also broaden the base and thus may allow across-the-
board tax rate reductions, though it would be imperative to retain at
least a mildly progressive rate structure if the Nondiscretionary
Deduction is to be a single deduction for all similarly situated
taxpayers, since each tranche of additional income contains ever-
larger percentages of income available for discretionary use. Finally,
an additional benefit of these reforms is that they would allow for
repeal of the AMT. More important, however, the net effect of these
changes would be a fairer and simpler tax system that empirically took
into account the reasonably unavoidable costs of living.
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